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Neo-­Orientalism	  and	  Co-­optation	  in	  American	  Academia	  
Tugrul	  Keskin	  and	  Reed	  Taylor
In	  the	  Post	  September	  11	  era,	  	  we	  have	  been	  witnessing	  a	  close	  and	  multifaceted	  relationship	  between	  state	  actors	  
and	  academia.	  The	  Aields	  of	  Islamic	  and	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  -­	  or	  Central	  Asian	  Studies	  -­	  are	  the	  main	  targets	  of	  this	  
co-­optation	   process,	  which	  has	  created	  its	  own	  children	  that	  are	  also	  embedded	  in	  the	  system	  of	  colonialism	  and	  
beneAit	   directly	  from	  the	   continuation	   of	  this	  trend.	   Consequently,	   Islam	  has	  become	   the	   target	   and	  Muslims	  the	  
subject	  of	  this	  neo-­colonialist	  process.	  These	  new	  groups	  of	  “scholars”	   should	  be	  called	  ‘Neo-­Orientalists’	  but	  they	  
are	   less	   knowledgeable	   than	   classical	   Orientalists,	   and	   they	   have	   a	   more	   complicated	   relationship	   with	   state	  
actors.	   The	  state	   needs	  them	  as	  much	  as	  they	  need	   the	   state	   for	   status	  and	  Ainancial	   beneAit.	  Most	   of	  these	   Neo-­
Orientalists	  focus	  on	  Women	  and	  Islam,	  or	  Terrorism	  and	  Islam;	  and	  in	  this	  context,	   	  they	  operate	   from	  a	  feeling	  
that	  they	  have	   the	  responsibility	  to	   ‘civilize’	  others.	   Their	  contribution	   to	   human	  civilization	  however,	   is	  nothing	  
more	   than	   an	   abstract	   of	   Rudyard	   Kipling’s	   civilization	   project.	   Saving	   a	   girl	   from	   Afghanistan’s	   oppressive	  
Taliban	   regime,	   rescuing	  the	   Iranian	  People	   from	  Ahmadinejad	  and	  the	  Mullah	  Regime;	  regardless	  of	  the	   actual	  
merits	  of	  these	  forms	  of	  leadership;	   	  and	  bringing	  democracy	  to	  the	   ‘savage	  Muslim	  societies’	  is	  the	  main	  purpose	  
of	  Neo-­Orientalists.	  In	   this	  sense,	   Islam	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  social	  structure	  of	  Muslim	  societies,	  but	  has	  been	  
portrayed	   as	   an	   ideological	   and	   uncivilized	   type	   of	   cult.	   Muslims	   should	   be	   liberated	   from	   their	   ‘backwards	  
traditions’	  and	  from	  Islam	  itself,	  which	  should	  at	  minimum	  be	  reformed	   	  in	  the	   interests	  of	  this	  new	  encroaching	  
imperialism.	  Neo-­Orientalist	  academics	  play	  an	   important	  role	  in	  perpetuating	  and	  strengthening	  this	  process.	   In	  
this	   issue,	   you	   will	   read	   the	   articles	   based	   on	   a	   non-­orientalist	   approach	   to	   Islam	   and	   Muslim	   Societies.	  
Salam and Peace to all, Tugrul and Reed 	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Islam	  and	  Identity	  among	  Uyghurs	  
Mettursun	  Beydulla	  -­	  bmettursun@gmail.com
Department	   of	   East	   Asian	   Languages	   and	  
Civilizations,	  Harvard	  University	  
Uyghurs	   are	   indigenous	   people	   in	   the	   Xinjiang	  
Uyghur	   Autonomous	   Region,	   PRC	   (aka	   East	  
Turkistan).	   Most	   of	   the	   world’s	   Uyghurs,	   Turkic-­‐
speaking	  Sunni	  Muslims	  who	  
belong	   to	   the	   HaniNi	   school	  
of	   Islam,	   live	   in	  Xinjiang.	   As	  
Islam	   has	   a	   1000	   year	   long	  
history	   in	   Xinjiang,it	   has	  
become	   integrated	   into	  
Uyghur	   cultural	   identity.	   To	  
be	  a	  Uyghur	  is	  to	  be	  Muslim.	  
Most	   Uyghurs	   ident i fy	  
themselves	   as	   Muslim,	   but	  
many	  do	  not	  have	  signiNicant	  
religious	   knowledge.	   Most	  
Uyghurs	   have	   acquired	   and	  
transmit	   Islamic	   knowledge	  
through	   the	   embodied	  
performances	   of	   day-­‐to-­‐day	  
living	   and	   life-­‐cycle	   events.	  
In	  post	   1949,	   the	  state	   took	  
control	   and	   ofNicial	   hostility	  
towards	   Islam	   altered	   the	  
condition	   of	   the	   “ulama”	   in	  
Uyghur	  society.	   Atheism	  was	  
p ro c l a imed	   a s	   p u b l i c	  
doctrine	  and	  the	  Han	  Chinese	  culture	  as	   the	  most	  
advanced	   of	   all	   cultures.	   Surveillance	   and	  
suppression	  of	   religion	  by	   the	   state	  have	  had	   the	  
paradoxical	  effect	  of	  strengthening	  the	  central	  role	  
of	   Islam	   in	  Uyghur	  life.	   (Fuller	   and	  Lipman	  2004,	  
pp	   334-­‐344).The	   current	   trend	   towards	  
assimilation	  through	  various	  educational,	  religious	  
and	  economic	  policies	  has	  encountered	  resistance	  
in	   the	   form	   of	   riots	   in	   Xinjiang	   and	   Uyghur	  
diasporas’	  resistance	  to	  the	  detention	  of	  activists.
History	  of	  Islam	  from	  Introduction	  to	  1949	  
From	   earliest	   times	  Xinjiang	   has	   had	  a	  history	  of	  
interaction	  with	  other	   cultures	   and	   	   places.	   This	  
has	   occurred	   through	  migration,	   travel,	   Silk	   Road	  
trade	  and	  imperial	  conquest.	  Xinjiang’s	  connection	  
with	  China	  dates	  back	  more	  than	  2,000	  years,	  but	  
has	   remained	  under	   the	  effective	   control	  of	  China	  
for	  less	  then	  Nive	  centuries.	  It	  was	  only	  in	  1884	  that	  
Xinjiang	  was	   brought	   within	  
the	   administrative	   structure	  
of	   the	   Chinese	   empire	   and	  
made	  a	  full-­‐Nledged	  province	  
(Millward,	   2007;	   Perdue,	  
2005).	   Islam	   entered	   from	  
Central	   Asia	   in	   960,	   and	   by	  
end	   tenth	   century	   Kashgar	  
and	  Hoten	   (the	   eastern	   and	  
southern	  parts	   of	   the	  Tarim	  
basin)	   had	   embraced	   Islam.	  
By	   the	   ea r ly -­‐ N i f t een th	  
century,	   the	   religion	   had	  
spread	  all	   the	  way	   to	  Qumul	  
(Hami).	  From	  this	  time	  SuNis,	  
Islamic	   mystics,	   spread	  
among	   the	   Uyghur	   in	   the	  
T a r i m	   B a s i n .	   T h e	  
Naqshbandiyaa	   SuNi	   order	  
was	   even	   able	   to	   seize	  
control	   of	   political	   and	  
military	   affairs	   in	   the	  Tarim	  
Basin	   and	   Turfan.	   Hidayet	  
Allah	  (aka	  Apaq	  Khoja	  or	  Khoja	  Apaq),	   a	  powerful	  
prince	   in	   Kashgar	   until	   the	   	   	   1670s,	   served	   as	  
governor	   of	   that	   city.	   Yaqub	  Beg	   ,	   an	  emir	   of	   the	  
Kashgar	   emirate	   (1864-­‐1877)	   claimed	   himself	   a	  
“protector”	  of	   Islam.	   In	  November	   1933	   the	   East	  
Turkistan	   Islamic	   Republic	   was	   established	   in	  
Kashgar,	   followed	   by	   the	   East	   Turkistan	  Republic	  
(1945-­‐1949)	   and	   in	   1949,	   Xinjiang	   fell	   under	  
Communist	  China’s	  control.	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Islam	   under	   the	   Peoples	   Republic	   of	   China	  
(1949-­1976)
In	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   PRC,	   the	   government’s	  
vision	  was	   to	   create	   national	   unity	   and	  establish	  
loyalty	   among	   all	   the	   minority	   populations	   by	  
promoting	   patriotism	   and	   socialist	   ideology.	  
Religious	  policies	  followed	  ideological	  swings	  that	  
alternated	   between	   periods	   of	   tightened	   central	  
control	   (underpinned	   by	   atheistic	   principles	   of	  
Marxism/Leninism)	   that	   suppressed	   Islam	   and	  
ethnic	   consciousness,	  
with	   periods	   of	   more	  
lenient	   policies.	   The	  
Great	   Leap	   Forward	  
(1958-­‐62)	   and	   the	  
Cultural	   Revolution	  
(1966-­‐76)	   were	   two	  
periods	   of	   the	   greatest	  
i n t o l e ran c e .	   Many	  
religious	  sites	  including	  
m o s q u e s	   w e r e	  
destroyed	   or	   changed	  
into	   warehouses	   or	  
pigsties.	   Any	   person	  
who	  exhibited	  religious	  
behavior	   or	   who	   had	  
played	   a	   role	   in	   the	  
clergy	  was	   labeled	   ‘counter	  revolutionary’,	   just	  as	  
intellectuals	   or	   secular	   local	   nationalists	   were.	  
Many	  members	   of	   the	   clergy	  such	  as	   sheikhs	  and	  
ishans	  (religious	   clerics)	  or	  believers	  suspected	  of	  
disloyalty	   were	   persecuted,	   sent	   to	   reeducation	  
camps	   (laogai),	   or	   even	  executed.	   Religions	   of	   all	  
types	  were	  forbidden,	  not	  just	  Islam.	   According	  to	  
the	   ofNicial	   government	   vision,	   the	   pre-­‐1949	  
situation	  was	   dominated	   by	   conservative	   Islamic	  
clergy	  and	  oppressive	  landlords	  who	  subjected	  the	  
population	   to	   conditions	   of	   serfdom	   and	  
ignorance.	   	   Post	   1949	   society	   was	   modern	   and	  
progressive,	   a	   time	  during	  which	  major	  economic	  
and	   social	   advances	   were	   made,	   including	  
advances	  in	  education	  and	  literacy.
1978-­1989	  Era	  of	  Reform	  
The	  era	   that	   started	  with	  the	   end	   of	   the	  Cultural	  
Revolution	   was	   the	   era	   of	   reform	   policies	   and	  
openness	   (gaige	  kaifang)	   that	   ofNicially	   started	   in	  
1980.Changes	   included:	   expansion	   of	   the	   school	  
system,	   a	   drop	   in	   illiteracy,	   an	   ofNicial	   softening	  
towards	  religion	  and	  the	  use	  of	  minority	  languages	  
in	   education.	   The	  consequences	   of	   some	  of	   these	  
changes	   were	   positive	   towards	   Uyghurs	   in	  
Xinjiang.	   There	   were	   more	   opportunities	   for	  
education	   and	   a	   moderate	  
r e t u r n	   o f	   r e l i g i o u s	  
p ra c t i c e s .	   C hu r c h e s ,	  
mosques,	   and	   temples	  
began	   to	   reopen	   in	   the	  
years	   following	   ofNicial	  
r e a u t h o r i z a t i o n	   i n	  
December	   1978.	   Atheism	  
no	   longer	   Nigured	   in	   the	  
c o n s t i t u t i o n	   a s	   t h e	  
Marxist-­‐Leninist	   vision	   of	  
religion	   as	   the	   “opium	   of	  
t h e	   p e o p l e ”	   w a s	  
completely	   forgotten.	   The	  
decade	   of	   1980	   to	   1990	  
saw	   a	   progressive	  opening	  
o f	   borders	   that	   made	  
Uyghur	  youth	  better	  able	  to	   travel	  more	  freely	  and	  
provided	  opportunities	   for	  spiritual	   exchange	  and	  
revival.	   	   Until	   the	  mid	  1990s	   hundreds	   of	   young	  
Uyghurs	   attended	   religious	   schools	   in	   Pakistan,	  
Egypt,	  Turkey,	  and	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  and	  a	  few	  of	  them	  
also	   headed	  to	  Yemen,	  Qatar,	   and	  Malaysia	   for	  the	  
same	   reason.	   The	   government	   sent	   some	  Uyghur	  
students,	  after	  years	  of	  training	  and	  observation	  at	  
the	   China	   Islamic	   Institution	   in	   Beijing,	   to	   study	  
Islam	   in	  Arabic	   counties,	   especially	   at	  Al-­‐Azhar	   in	  
Egypt.	   However,	   Al-­‐Azhar	   University	   today	  
requires	  Uyghurs	   students	   to	   have	  approval	   from	  
the	  local	   Chinese	  embassy.	  Currently	  hundreds	  of	  
students	   study	   Islam	   at	   Al-­‐Azhar	   University	   and	  
most	  of	  them	  use	   their	  own	  networks	  and	  money	  
or	   are	   dependent	   on	   small	   amounts	  of	   university	  
scholarship.
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1990	  to	  the	  present	  and	  the	  future	  of	  Islam
Policy	  changes	   that	  date	  from	  1989/1990	  include	  
changes	   in	   religious	   tolerance	   which	   were	  
mirrored	   in	   a	   crackdown	   on	   religious	   education.	  
Attitudes	   towards	   Uyghurs	   involved	   reforms	   or	  
reinterpretations	   of	   ofNicial	   policies	   towards	  
religion,	   education,	   and	   cultural	   expression.	   To	  
meet	   these	   new	   expectations,	   a	   textbook	   about	  
atheism	  was	  promulgated	  for	  use	  by	  the	  young	   in	  
Xinjiang.	   Communist	   party	   members	   and	   cadres	  
are	   by	   deNinition	   Marxist	   materialists	   and	  
therefore	   could	   not	   be	   allowed	   to	   believe	   in	   and	  
practice	   religion.	   Although	   under	   Chinese	   law,	  
citizens	   have	   two	   religious	   freedoms:	   the	  right	   to	  
believe	  and	  the	   right	   to	   not	   to	   believe	   in	   religion.	  
Party	  members	  had	  to	  choose	  the	  latter.
After	   1990,	   ofNicials	   began	   to	   prosecute	   illegal	  
religious	   activities,	   ofNicially	   removed	   suspected	  
clerics,	   broke	   up	   unauthorized	   medrasas,	   and	  
stopped	  construction	  of	  mosques.	  The	  government	  
instituted	   a	   quota	   for	   each	   village	   and	   all	   of	   the	  
mosques	   over	   this	   quota	   were	   demolished.	   The	  
government	   began	   to	   issue	   licenses	   for	   legal	  
mosques,	   reviewed	   appointments	   of	   imams	   and	  
started	   an	   ‘education	   in	   atheism’	   campaign.	   The	  
policy	   of	   atheistic	   only	   party	   members	   became	  
even	   more	   restricted	   after	   September	   11,	   2001.	  
(Amnesty	   International	   2002)	   Thus	   began	   a	  
Sinicization	   by	   educating	   Uyghurs	   into	   the	  
acquisition	  of	  Chinese	  culture.	  Legally,	   neither	  the	  
Koran	   nor	   religion	   could	   be	   taught	   to	   students	  
younger	   than	   eighteen.	   Chinese	   schools	   and	  
television	   reinforced	  this	   Sinicization	   by	   teaching	  
‘patriotism’	   (aiguo	   zhuyi)	  at	   the	  expense	  of	   other	  
cultural	  expressions.	  
After	   9/11,	   restrictions	   also	   included	   banning	  
religious	   practices	   during	   Ramadan,	   increasing	  
control	   over	   Islamic	   clergy,	   and	   the	   detention	   or	  
arrest	   of	   religious	   leaders	   who	   had	   been	   labeled	  
‘unpatriotic’	  or	  ‘subversive’.	  (Human	  Rights	  Watch	  
2005)	  	  Restrictions	  included	  the	  annual	  pilgrimage	  
to	  Mecca.	  “In	  contemporary	  Xinjiang,	   the	  power	  of	  
the	  state	  to	   regulate	  religion,	   including	  Islam,	   has	  
brought	   the	   forces	   of	   law	   and	   order	   into	   direct	  
conNlict	   with	   Muslims	   who	   are	   trying	   to	   live	  
according	   the	   tenets	   of	   their	   faith”	   (Fuller	   and	  
Lipman	  2004,	  p.	  323)	  The	  practice	  of	  religion	  thus	  
became	  limited	  to	  the	  private	  sphere	  and	  morality,	  
and	  Islamic	  elites	  who	   once	  beneNitted	  from	   their	  
economic	   power	   as	   religious	   elites	   began	   to	  
depend	  on	   state	   recognition	   and	  control	   in	   order	  
to	  receive	  their	  salaries.	  
Education	   is	   the	   key	   to	   Sinicization.	   In	   order	   to	  
speed	   up	   integration,	   experimental	   ‘bilingual’	  
language	   classes	   for	   middle	   and	   high	   school	   for	  
minority	  students	  were	  established.	  In	  1997,	  these	  
provided	   a	   new	   model	   for	   compulsory	   Chinese	  
language	  education	  and	  the	  marginalization	  of	  the	  
Uyghur	   language	   as	   well	   as	   other	   minority	  
languages	   in	  Xinjiang.	   By	   using	   the	  term	  bilingual	  
education,	   the	   government	   is	   implementing	   a	  
monolingual	   language	   education	   system	   that	  
undermines	  the	  linguistic	   basis	  of	  Uyghur	  culture.	  
Chinese	  has	  become	  the	  only	  ofNicial	  language	  and	  
is	   now	   the	   language	   of	   instruction	  in	  all	   levels	  of	  
Uyghur	   schools	   including	   kindergarten.	   (Dwyer,	  
2005)
As	  well	  as	  bilingual	   education,	   changes	   in	   the	  use	  
of	   the	   Uyghur	   language	   and	   culture	   through	  
publications	   and	   religious	   practices	   have	   been	  
suppressed	   as	   the	   government	   has	   exerted	  more	  
and	   more	   control	   over	   every	   aspect	   of	   life	   in	  
Xinjiang.	   Now,	   Uyghurs	  have	  become	   strangers	   in	  
their	  own	  land.	   (Bovingdon	  2010)	  Since	  2002	  the	  
government	   has	   implemented	   a	   labor	   export	  
program	   which	   brings	   rural	   Uyghur	   workers,	  
especially	   female	   workers,	   from	   south-­‐west	  
Xinjiang	   to	   the	   Han-­‐dominated	   factories	   of	   the	  
Chinese	   industrial	   core.	   During	   the	   Nirst	   half	   of	  
2009	  alone,	  the	  labor	  export	  plan	  had	  transported	  
96,000	  Uyghur	  workers.
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This	  labor	  export	  program	  is	  part	  of	  a	  strategy	  for	  
assimilating	   Uyghurs,	   eroding	   their	   sense	   of	  
national	   identity,	   and	  stamping	  out	  their	  religious	  
beliefs.	   Many	   contend	   that	   is	   naïve	   to	   say	   the	  
program	   is	   aiding	   Xinjiang	   development,	   but	  
instead	  it	  is	  a	  program	  that	  divides	  and	  assimilates	  
in	   the	   name	   of	   ‘opportunity	   for	   all’.	   At	   the	   same	  
time	   the	   government	   is	   encouraging	   Han	  
immigration	  which	  has	  increased	  to	  40%	  from	  4%	  
in	  the	  last	  70	  years.	  	  
Uyghur	   advocates	   both	   in	   Xinjiang	   and	   in	   the	  
Diaspora	   have	   sought	   religious	   and	   secular	  
education	   for	   all	   members	   of	   the	   Uyghur	  
community	   so	   that	   Xinjiang	   can	   develop	   its	   own	  
indigenous,	   ethnically	   conscious	   professional	  
classes.	   The	   Uyghur	   language	   is	   a	   depository	   of	  
Uyghur	   culture	   and	   history	   and	   Islam	   is	   an	  
element	   of	   identity	   that	   is	   intimately	   bound	   up	  
with	   the	   Uyghur	   language.	   For	   Uyghurs	   it	   is	  
unthinkable	   not	   to	   have	   religion,	   their	   own	  
language	  and	  literature.	  
For	   the	   foreseeable	   future,	   unfortunately	   we	   can	  
see	  a	  continuation	  of	  current	  policies	  with	  regards	  
to	   religion,	   education,	   loss	   of	  mother	   tongue,	   and	  
immigration	  of	   non-­‐Muslim	   populations	   from	   the	  
east	  into	  Xinjiang.	  Uyghurs	  will	  have	  to	  comply	  or	  
resist	  an	  environment	  that	  makes	  their	  practice	  of	  
Islam	   potentially	   dangerous.	   Unrest	   among	   the	  
population	   has	   led	   to	   increased	   arrests	   for	  
suspicious	   behavior	   or	   ideas	   as	   well	   as	   more	  
aggressive	   methods	   of	   showing	   national	   pride	  
such	   as	   the	   Ghulja	   incident	   of	   1997	   (Bovingdon,	  
2004)	   and	   the	   Urumchi	   riots	   of	   2009.	   Uyghur	  
Diasporas	  have	  pushed	  back	  and	  have	  campaigned	  
for	  the	  rights	  of	  Uyghurs.	  The	  Xinjiang	  situation	  is	  
similar	  to	  the	  threat	  to	  Tibet	  in	  that	  Uyghur	  culture	  
could	  come	  to	   the	  brink	  of	  extinction.	  Islam	  is	  one	  
of	   the	   keys	   to	   identity	   and	   continuity	   of	  Uyghur	  
communities.
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Islamism	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In	   light	   of	  all	   the	   recent	   events	   that	   have	   shaken	  
the	  political	  systems	  in	  Muslim	  countries,	  post-­‐cold	  
war	  era	  world	  affairs,	  and	  to	  some	  extent	  academic	  
curriculums	   in	  political	  science	  and	  sociology,	   it	  is	  
useful	   to	   explain	  the	   historic	   evolution	  of	  political	  
Islam,	   currently	   known	   as	   Islamism.	   Islamist	  
parties	   (legalists),	   such	  as	   the	   party	  of	  the	   Justice	  
and	   Development	   (APK)	   in	   Turkey,	   the	   MSP	   in	  
Algeria,	   Hamas	   in	   Ghaza,	   or	   Hezb	   Allah	  (inspired	  
by	   the	  Shea’a	  doctrine	  (el-­‐marja’eaya)	  in	  Lebanon,	  
are	   adapting	   well,	   more	   or	   less,	   with	   the	  
mechanisms	   of	   democracy.	   There	   are	   also	   small	  
fanatical	   groups,	   el-­‐Qae’eda	   for	   instance,	   which	  
proclaim	   to	   also	   be	   inspired	   by	   Islamic	   political	  
theory;	   in	   this	   is	   case,	   it	   is	   used	   as	   political	  
ideology	   rather	   than	   a	   political	   party	   playing	   a	  
political	  role	  in	  the	  democratic	  process.	  
According	  to	   the	  deNinition	  of	  Joseph	  Lapalombara	  
and	  Myron	  Weiner,	  political	  parties	  must:	  
-­‐	   be	   a	   lasting	   and	   sustainable	   organization	   that	  
makes	  its	  existence	  in	  space	  and	  	   	  	  time.
-­‐	  have	  a	  will	  to	  seize	  power.
include	   a	   search	   for	   popular	   support	   through	  
elections	  or	  other	  means	  (1).
Islamist	  political	  parties	  appeared	  during	  a	  period	  
of	   social	   and	   political	   transition,	   challenging	   the	  
political	  regimes	  that	  have	  been	  in	  power	  for	  a	  long	  
time	   through	   either	   military	   coups	   or	   the	  
emergence	   o f	   nat iona l is t	   independence	  
movements.	   As	   they	   have	   never	   left	   power,	   they	  
have	   been	   legitimized	   and	   the	   Islamists	   have	  
become	  a	  horizontal	  alternative	  to	  the	  status	  quo.	  
The	  exigence	   of	  Unity	   in	   Islam	  disallows	   any	   idea	  
of	   division	   within	   the	   nation	   of	   el-­‐Oumah	   el-­‐
Islamiya	   (the	   Islamic	   nation)	   into	   clans	   and	  
factions.	   In	   the	   Koran,	   the	   term	   (2)	  Hezb	  (party),	  
which	  in	  the	  current	  Arab-­‐Muslim	  world	  serves	  to	  
indicate	  a	  party	  in	  the	  modern	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  is	  
pejoratively	   employed	   (3).	   However,	   there	   are	  
examples	   where	   the	   nation	   has	   been	   divided	   (4).	  
Moreover,	   the	   idea	   of	   political	   parties	   has	   varied	  
adaptations	   in	   the	   Arab-­‐Muslim	   world.	   From	   the	  
last	   quarter	   of	   the	   XIXth	   century,	   Ahmed	   Orabi	  
appears	   as	   the	   leader	   of	   a	   nationalist	   party,	   The	  
Egyptian	   Resistance,	   emerging	   above	   all	   the	  
factions	   raging	   among	   the	   Egyptian	   people;	   to	  
indicate	  this	  party,	   Ahmed	  Orabi	  employs	  the	  term	  
Hezb	  (5).	   In	  the	  1920’s	  in	  Syria	  and	  Iraq,	  a	  secular	  
movement	   that	  was	   the	   voice	  of	  modernity	   arose	  
with	   the	   Arab	   societies	   out	   of	   the	   post-­‐Ottoman	  
Empire	   dislocation,	   replacing	   political	   religious	  
sentiments	   with	   secular	   values.	   Michel	   ANlak	   and	  
Salah	  Bitar	  became	  the	  founding	  fathers	  of	  an	  Arab	  
republicanism	   based	   on	   ethnicity	   and	   not	  
religiosity.	  This	  political	  movement	  put	  the	  modern	  
structures	   of	   the	  nation-­‐state	   in	  Iraq	  and	  Syria	   in	  
place,	   and	  paved	   the	  road	  to	   a	   political	   Arab	  elite,	  
adopting	  the	  ideas	  of	  democratic	  values,	  which	  led	  
to	   the	   creation	  of	   el-­‐Ba’aath	   (the	   resurrection)	  of	  
the	   Arab	   nation,	   contrary	   to	   the	   Islamists	   who	  
were	   nostalgic	   and	   saddened	  by	   the	  death	  of	   the	  
Islamic	   Caliphate	  under	   the	   reign	   of	   the	  Ottoman	  
Empire	   in	   1928.	   This	   initiated	   the	   dichotomy	  
between	   Islamists	   and	   nationalists’	   societal	  
objectives.	  Nationalists	  look	  at	  the	  Arabic	  Nation	  as	  
entity	   of	   common	   language	   and	   common	  destiny,	  
whereas	  the	  Islamists	  look	  at	  the	  Ouma	  (Nation)	  as	  
not	  a	  nationality	  but	  a	  religion.
Consequently,	   the	   Egyptian	   Islamists	   founded	  
Jema’eyat	   el-­‐	   Ekhoaun	   (the	   Association	   of	   the	  
Brotherhood)	   in	   Egypt.	   Equally,	   the	   Algerian	  
reformists	   created	   the	   Theologians’	   Association	  
(Jema’eyat	   el-­‐Oulama	   el-­‐Mousslimine)	   in	   1931;	  
thus,	   the	  Algerian	  case	  was	   rather	  for	  identity	  and	  
political	  nationalism	  than	  nostalgia	  towards	  the	  fall	  
of	   the	   Caliphate,	   because	   they	   realized	   that	  
religious	   sentiment	   can	   be	   used	   as	   a	   common	  
denominator	   to	   unify	   the	   Algerian	   masse	   and,	  
virtually,	   the	   nationalist	   elite	   to	   stand	   up	   to	   the	  
French	  occupation	  and	  its	  assimilationist	  policies.
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Others	   religious	   movements	   were	   taking	   place	   in	  
Pakistan,	   for	   example,	   the	   proclamation	   of	   the	  
Pakistani	   State	   in	  1947,	  where	   the	   Islamic	  Group	  
(el-­‐Jama’aa	   el-­‐Islamiya)	   led	   by	   Abou	   el-­‐a’ala	   el-­‐
Maoudoudi	   played	   a	  major	   role	   in	  the	   autonomy.	  
In	   1979	   the	   Islamic	   revolution	   led	   by	   Imam	   el-­‐
Khoumeini	   in	   Iran	   not	   only	   regenerated	   the	  
Islamist	   ideology	   but	   was	   considered	   as	   the	  
rebirth	   of	   the	   Islamist	   political	   project	   for	   the	  
Islamist	  militants	   across	   the	   Muslim	   world,	   even	  
though,	   the	  mainstream	  islamist	  militants	   did	  not	  
share	   el-­‐Khoumeini’s	   doctrine.	   Dr.	   Abassi	   (the	  
leader	  of	  the	  ex-­‐FIS)	  was	  asked	  about	  the	  Mullah’s	  
model;	   he	   responded,	   explaining	   his	   party’s	  
difference	   with	   Iran,	   saying	   not	   to	   get	   confused	  
between	   sugar	   and	  salt-­‐-­‐they	   are	   the	   same	   color	  
but	  they	  taste	  different.	  Nonetheless,	   the	  Islamists	  
supported	   el-­‐Khoumeini	   in	   his	   war	   against	  
Sadam’s	   regime	  because	   they	   identiNied	   the	   Night	  
as	  between	  secularism	  and	  Islamism	  (6).	  The	  year	  
1979	  was	  a	  turning	  point	  of	  Islamist	  ideology	  and	  
witnessed	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Jihadist	  
movement	   and	  the	  invasion	  of	  Afghanistan	  by	  the	  
Red	   Army.	   Among	   the	   young	   Islamists	   on	  
university	   campuses	   and	   in	   local	   mosques,	   the	  
story	  line	  became	  Jihad	  against	  the	  Red	  Satan.	  
It	   is	   important	   to	   point	   out	   that	   inside	   the	  Arab-­‐
Muslim	   political	   systems,	   there	   was	   a	   certain	  
tendency	   toward	   the	   idea	   of	   the	   unique	   party,	  
which	  was	   described	  by	   the	   regimes	   as	   el-­‐wahda	  
or	   wihdet	   el-­‐qeyada	   (unity	   in	   directing	   and	  
guiding	   the	   nations’	   domestic	   and	   international	  
affairs).	   For	   instance	   in	   Egypt,	   Raïs	   Gamel	  
Abdenasser	   used	   the	   unity	   factor	   as	   a	   means	   of	  
expression	   to	   assemble	   all	   the	   constitutional	  
attributions	  and	  powers	  into	   a	  personal	  power.	   In	  
Tunisia,	   this	   idea	   of	   the	   gathering	   of	   power	  
becomes	  the	  product	  of	  an	  authoritarian	  drift,	  as	  it	  
does	   in	   Algeria,	   where	   the	   National	   Liberation	  
Front	  (F.L.N)	  (7)	  was	  born	  through	  the	  triumph	  of	  
the	   revolution.	   Indeed,	   the	   Algerian	   uprising	   was	  
the	  work	  of	  the	  Revolutionary	  Committee	  of	  Union	  
and	   Action	   (C.R.U.A),	   which	   was	   transformed	  
through	   the	   armed	   operations	   of	   the	   revolution,	  
joined	   progressively	   by	   all	   other	   political	  
formations	   including	   the	   Islamist	   current	   in	   the	  
Algerian	  National	  Movement,	   until	   it	   became	   the	  
National	   Liberation	  Front.	   In	  Algeria,	   the	  F.L.N.	   at	  
once	   took	   a	   dominating	   position	   and	   laid	   solid	  
structures	   to	   achieve	   the	   objectives	   of	   the	  
revolution	   and	   to	   establish	   the	   socialist	  model	   in	  
Algeria,	   according	   the	   1963	   Constitution	   (8),	  
which	  was	  amended	  in	  the	  National	  Charter,	  which	  
became	   the	   spiritual	   text	   of	   the	   Constitution	   of	  
1976.	  
The	  Islamists	  were	  arguing	  that	  to	   limit	  and	  crash	  
any	   political	   opposition	   is	   foreign	   to	   the	   Islamic	  
political	   doctrine;	   in	  the	  meantime,	   they	   saw	   and	  
still	  see	  themselves	  as	  the	  guardians	  of	  the	  Islamic	  
doctrine.	  Hence	  it	  would	  be	  indispensable	  to	  bring	  
their	   contribution	   to	   the	   construction	   of	   the	  
political	   structures	   in	   Islamic	   societies	   (9).	   One	  
could	  also	   argue	   that	   it	   is	   true	   that	   according	   to	  
Islamic	   doctrine	  any	  expression	  of	  division	  within	  
the	  Islamic	   nation	   (el-­‐Oumah	  el-­‐Islamiya)	  clashes	  
with	  the	  deNinition	  of	  democracy	  and	  its	  principals,	  
because	  this	  would	  explicitly	  imply	  that	  the	  nation	  
(el-­‐Oumah)	   would	   divide	   into	   clans	   and	   small	  
territories	  instead	  of	  being	  united	  from	  Jakarta	  to	  
Tangier.
To	   understand	   this	   political	   development	   in	  
political	   Islamic	   theory,	   it	   is	  necessary	   to	   go	   back	  
to	   the	  end	  of	  the	  XIIIth	  century,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Mamlouks	   (el-­‐mamaleeks),	   when	   Muslims	   were	  
facing	  a	  period	  of	  social	  injustice,	  oppression	  and	  a	  
culture	  of	  political	  corruption	  and	  division.	  Then	  a	  
major	   Nigure,	   the	   sheïkh	   Taqi	   eddine	   Ahmed	   Ibn	  
taymiya,	   was	   born	   in	   Damascus	   in	   a	   family	   of	  
lawyers	   and	   theologians.	   Standing	   up	  against	   the	  
Mamlouks’	   regime,	   writing	   about	   the	   corruption	  
and	   the	   unjust	   policies	   of	   the	   regime,	   he	   was	   a	  
voice	   of	   a	   strong	   opposition,	   but	   with	   religious	  
perspective,	   he	   did	   not	   preach	   any	   means	   of	  
violence.	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The	  Mamlouks’	   leaders	   created	  a	   sense	   that	   they	  
got	   to	   legitimize	   their	   actions	   and	   their	   power	  
from	   the	  Oulemas	   (religious	   council)	  whom	  were	  
under	  palace	  authority.	  This	  is	  practically	  the	  same	  
conNlict	  which	  is	  currently	  occurring	  in	  the	  Muslim	  
wo r l d	   b e tw e e n	   f u n d am e n t a l i s t s	   a n d	  
traditionalists,	   for	   instance,	   the	   discord	   between	  
the	  Brotherhood	  and	  el-­‐Azhar	  institution	  in	  Egypt	  
or	   the	   Islamists	   shouyoukh	  and	   the	  High	   Islamic	  
Council	   in	   Algeria.	   In	   the	   XIIIth	   century,	   it	  was	   a	  
difNicult	   situation	   between	   Ibn	   Taymiya	   and	   his	  
teachings	  on	   one	   hand	  and	   the	  reaction	   from	   the	  
regime	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  Mamlouks’	  regime	  was	  a	  
military	   dictatorship	   style	   of	   governance.	   One	  
reason	   that	   pushed	   Ibn	   taymiya	   to	   speak	   up	  and	  
denounce	   the	  Mamlouks’	   incompetency	   was	   that	  
according	   to	   his	   teachings	   their	   regime	   was	  
illegitimate	  and	  one	  must	  stand	  up	  and	  Night	  their	  
acts.	   He	   wrote	   a	   political	   book	   that	   has	   become	  
famous	   among	   the	   Islamist	   political	   literature	  
titled	   The	   Legal	   Politics	   (Essiyassa	   echare’eya)	  
(10).	   He	  underlines	  the	  beneNits	  of	  the	  total	   union	  
of	   the	   spiritual	   and	   the	   material.	   He	   posits	   that	  
politics	   should	   be	   compatible	   with	   moral	  
standards	   as	   long	   as	   it	   does	   not	   corrupt	   and	  
deviate	   from	   Allah’s	   recommendations	   (Shar’aa	  
Allah).
The	   Islamist	   idea	   was	   relaunched	   by	   sheïkh	  
Mohammed	   Ibn	   Abdelwahab	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
XVIIIth.	  He	  recommended	  to	  return	  to	  the	  basics	  of	  
puritanical	   Islam.	   His	   doctrine	   dominated	   the	  
Arabian	  peninsula.	  Later	  on,	  Emir	  Ibn	  Sa'aoud,	  the	  
founding	   father	   of	   the	   Saoud	   dynasty,	   made	   a	  
politico-­‐religious	  pact	  which	  obeyed	  the	  Wahabite	  
doctrine,	   creating	   a	   paradoxical	   model	   which	  
opted	  for	  a	  sort	  of	  a	  western	  capitalistic	  model	  of	  
governance	  with	  an	  absolute	  distrust	  towards	  any	  
westernized	  way	  of	  life	   in	   the	  Saudi	   society	   (11).	  
This	   doctrine	   inspired	   the	   Talban’s	   regime	   in	  
Afghanistan	   between	   September	   1996	   and	  
November	   2001,	   as	   well	   as	   other	   monarchies	   in	  
the	   region	  and	   the	   supranational	   organization	  of	  
el-­‐Qae’eda	  (12).	  
In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   XIXth	   century,	   the	  
reformist	   movement	   (Harakat	   el-­‐eslah)	   made	   its	  
appearance.	   Political	   scientist	   and	   French	  
sociologist	   Louis	   Gardet	   noticed	   that	   the	   term	  
“reform”	   clashes	   with	   the	   term	   “revolution”;	   he	  
added	   that	   Muslim	   reformists	   portrayed	  
themselves	   as	   modernists	   rather	   than	   radical	  
revolutionaries.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   Algerian	  
fundamentalists,	  they	  reformed	  while	  delaying	  the	  
revolution,	   reviving	   the	   ashes	   of	   the	   Algerian	  
nation	   and	   sowing	   a	   means	   of	   political	  
conscientiousness	   among	   the	   young	   indigenous,	  
which	   was	   seen	   as	   a	   religious	   awakening	   in	   the	  
Muslim	  world.	  	  
The	   Nirst	   initiator	   of	   the	  movement	   is	   the	   sheïkh	  
Djamel	  Eddine	  el-­‐Afghani,	  who	  is	  especially	  known	  
in	  France	  for	  his	  debate	  with	  Renan.	  It	  is	  necessary	  
to	   mention	   his	   colleague	   sheïkh	   Mohammed	  
Abdou,	  and	  his	  followers	  Rachid	  Redha	  in	  Syria,	  El-­‐
kaouakibi	   in	   Egypt,	   and	   Ibn	   Badiss	   in	   Algeria.	  
According	   to	   Gardet,	   in	   the	   origin	   of	   any	   reform	  
there	   is	   a	   tendency	   towards	   a	   will	   of	   domestic	  
transformation:	  "For	  those	  facing	  the	  Occident,	  the	  
Muslim	   people	   must	   acquire	   mastery	   of	   the	  
technology	   but	   they	   must	   not	   renounce	   the	  
authentic	   values	   of	   Islam."	   It	   is	   a	   political	  
argument	   that	   the	   neo-­‐reformists	   and	   the	   neo-­‐
Islamists	   use	   today,	   trying	   to	   make	   the	   Islamist	  
ideology	  a	  political	  inspiration	  that	  is	  valuable	  and	  
adaptable	  at	   any	  time	  and	  in	  any	   space.	   However,	  
on	   the	   other	   side,	   the	   Muslim	   secularists	   argue	  
that	  this	  is	  outdated	  and	  it	  cannot	  be	  adaptable	  by	  
modern	  society.	   The	  argument	   of	  credibility	   goes	  
beyond	   the	   sectarian	   dispute	   within	   the	   Islamic	  
doctrine,	  whether	  She’ea	  or	  Sunna.	  
Both	   doctrines	   believe	   vehemently	   that	   Islam	   is	  
compatible	   with	   modernity.	   The	   Mullahs	   in	   Iran	  
argue	   that	   mastering	   technology	   is	   a	   religious	  
duty.	   So	   the	   Sunnit	   Islamists	   are	   seeing	   Turkey’s	  
Islamist	   party	   as	   a	   political	   model.	   It	   is	   a	   fair	  
example:	  the	  AKP	  (Justice	  and	  Development	  Party)
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is	   leading	   the	   most	   secular	   institutionalized	  
Muslim	  country	  with	  the	  party	   showing	  how	  well	  
it	  is	  adapted.	   	  In	  some	  instances	  it	  is	  succeeding	  in	  
marrying	   Islamic	   doctrine	   with	   democracy	   or	  
modern	   governing	   practices.	   A	   comprehensive	  
analogy	  would	  be	  the	  model	  characterized	  through	  
the	   Center	   Christian	   Democrats	   in	   Europe.	  
Remember	   Sheikh	   Nahnah,	   the	   founder	   of	   the	  
Algerian	   MSP,	   used	   the	   phrase:	   Choura-­‐cracy.	  
(governing	  with	  the	  consultation	  principal).	  	  
In	  sum,	   the	  Islamists	   are	  moving	  away	   from	   their	  
rhe tor i ca l	   oppos i t i on	   o f	   an t i -­‐po l i t i c a l	  
establishment	   and	  anti-­‐secularism,	   Niguring	   out	   a	  
new	   strategy,	   and	   looking	   for	   political	   consensus	  
and	   mutual	   trust	   among	   the	   political	   class	   in	  
Muslim	   societies.	   Alas,	   mistrust	   sometimes	   leads	  
to	   political	   violence,	   a	   social	   phenomena	   that	  
disturbs	   the	   cycle	   of	   societal	   progress	   and	   the	  
possibility	   to	   move	   Arabs	   and	   Muslims	   toward	  
pluralistic	   societies.	   Also	   another	   hypothesis	   to	  
demystify	   the	   Islamism	   ideology	   is	   to	   let	   the	  
Islamists	  (legalists)	  put	  into	  practice	  their	  political	  
project	  and	  governing,	  a	  plausible	  scenario	   in	  that	  
the	  moderate	  Islamists	  are	  willing	  to	  cohabit	  with	  
the	   regimes.	   An	   interesting	   political	   model	   that	  
could	   emerge	   in	   Arab	   societies	   is	   a	   probable	  
National-­‐Islamist	   coalition,	   a	  tactical	   move	  by	   the	  
regimes	  to	  eradicate	  the	  radical	   Islamist	  militants;	  
the	  Islamist	   centrists	  will	   look	   credible	  politically	  
to	  the	  masses.	   In	  the	  long	  run,	   it	   is	  a	  possibility	  to	  
introduce	  the	  civic	  spirit	  to	  the	  public	  which	  would	  
ultimately	   lead	   the	  Arab	   and	  Muslim	   societies	   to	  
become	   democratic-­‐-­‐certainly	   with	   a	   social	  
contract	   that	   the	   tri-­‐parties	   (the	   military	  
institution,	   the	   Islamists,	   and	   the	   elite	   liberals)	  
Nind	  a	  consensus.	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“I	   don’t	   know	   why	   we	   did	   not	   win	   seats.	   	   Maybe	  
people	   do	  not	  want	  religious	  leaders	  to	  be	  political	  
leaders”
Interview	   with	   campaign	   volunteer	   a	  
local	   Islamic	   Political	   Party	   in	   Aceh,	  
Indonesia	  (20	  April	  2009)
Two	  of	  the	  most	   important	  global	  trends	  in	  recent	  
decades	  have	  been	  the	  Islamic	  resurgence	  and	  the	  
third	  wave	   of	  democratization.	   	   Indonesia	   stands	  
out	   as	   having	   experienced	   both	   in	   full	   force.	  
Indonesia	   is	   home	   to	   a	   plurality	   of	   the	   world’s	  
Muslims,	  who	  represent	  210	  million,	  or	  88%,	  of	  its	  
citizens.	   	   Indonesian	   Muslims	   have	   become	  
increasingly	   pious	   over	   the	   past	   thirty	   years.	  
Meanwhile,	   since	   1998,	   Indonesia	   has	   embarked	  
on	   an	   impressive	   journey	   towards	   democracy,	  
ranking	  as	  the	  sole	  liberal	  democracy	  in	  Southeast	  
Asia	   or	   the	   Muslim	   world	   (Kunkler	   and	   Stepan	  
2011).
While	   Indonesia	   proves	   that	   Islamicization	   and	  
democratization	   are	   by	   no	   means	   contradictory	  
forces,	   the	   2009	   elections	   revealed	  an	   interesting	  
trend.	   	  Islamic	   political	  parties	   suffered	  a	  notable	  
decline,	   leading	   prominent	   scholars	   to	   view	  
Indonesia	   as	   a	   “secular	   democracy”	   (Mujani	   and	  
Liddle,	  2009).	   	  What	  accounts	   for	  these	  seemingly	  
contradictory	  trends—the	  Islamicization	  of	  society	  
and	  the	   apparent	   secularization	   of	  politics?	   	   The	  
answer	   lies	   in	   the	   increasing	   religiosity	   of	   non-­‐
Islamic,	   nationalist	   parties.	   	   In	   stark	   contrast	   to	  
previous	   eras	   in	   Indonesian	   politics,	   all	   political	  
parties	   have	   now	   accepted	   Islamic	   elements	   in	  
their	   organizat ion ,	   pol ic ies ,	   and	   image	  
(Tanuwidjaja	   2010).	   	   Support	   for	   Islamic	   parties	  
has	   declined	   as	   voters	   feel	   that	   their	   religious	  
interests	   are	   sufNiciently	   represented	   by	  
mainstream	   parties.	   	   This	   suggests	   that	  
Indonesians	  want	  Islam	  in	  politics,	  but	  not	  Islamic	  
Politics.
Islam	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Indonesia	  	  
As	   Indonesia	   gained	   independence,	   many	  
nationalist	   leaders	   agreed	   with	   Dutch	   colonizers	  
that	  politics	  should	  be	  a	  secular	  affair.	   	  During	  the	  
1955	   elections,	   four	   major	   parties	   emerged,	  
representing	   nationalists,	   communist,	   traditional	  
Muslims,	  and	  reformist	  Muslims.	   	  In	  1965,	  Sukarno	  
was	  overthrown	  and	  General	   Suharto	  emerged	  as	  
the	   country’s	   new	   President.	   	   Suharto	   mobilized	  
Islamic	   groups	   in	   the	   massacre	   of	   communist	  
forces	   and	  sought	   to	   institutionalize	   Islam	  within	  
his	  New	  Order.	   	  In	  the	  highly	  constrained	  elections	  
of	   1971,	   the	   Nahdlatul	   Ulama	   emerged	   as	   the	  
opposition,	  prompting	  the	  President	  to	  establish	  a	  
single	   state-­‐controlled	   Islamic	   party,	   the	   United	  
Deve l opmen t	   Pa r t y	   (Pa r t a i	   P e r s a t uan	  
Pembangunan,	   PPP),	   to	   contain	   political	   Islam.	  
Facing	   continued	  Islamic	   opposition	  to	  a	  range	  of	  
government	   policies,	   Suharto	   weakened	   the	   PPP,	  
demanding	   that	   Islamic	   groups	   adopt	   a	   secular	  
platform.	   	   In	   this	   environment,	   many	   leading	  
Islamic	   Nigures	   withdrew	   from	   political	   life.	  
Leading	   Islamic	   scholars	   even	   suggested	   that	  
Islam	  would	  best	  be	  served	   by	   removing	   religion	  
from	   the	   political	   sphere,	   enabling	   reformers	   to	  
focus	  on	  social	  change	  (Barton	  1997).
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This	   new	   focus,	   combined	   with	   a	   global	   Islamic	  
resurgence,	  led	  to	  a	  more	  observant	  society.	  	  In	  the	  
early	   1990s,	   even	   President	   Suharto	   moved	  
towards	   Islam,	   largely	   to	   balance	   an	   assertive	  
military.	   	   Suharto	   undertook	   the	   Pilgrimage,	  
opened	   new	   Islamic	   schools,	   promoted	   Islamic	  
ofNicials,	   and	   funded	   an	   Islamic	   think-­‐tank.	  
Meanwhile,	   calls	   for	   political	   change	   were	  
increasingly	  heard	  from	  what	  Hefner	  (2000)	  refers	  
to	   as	   “Civil	   Islam”,	   namely	   organizations	   such	   as	  
the	   traditionalist	   Nahdlatul	   Ulama	   and	   the	  
modernist	  Muhammadiyah.	   	  Abdurrahman	  Wahid	  
and	   Amien	   Rais,	   the	   leaders	   of	   these	   mass	  
organizations,	   were	   at	   the	   forefront	   of	   the	  
democratization	  movement.	   	  With	  the	  1998	  Asian	  
Economic	   Crisis,	   Suharto	   was	   forced	   to	   resign,	  
stepping	   aside	  in	   favour	   of	  B.J.	   Habibie,	   a	   leading	  
New	   Order	   Islamic	   ofNicial,	   who	   immediately	  
embarked	  on	  reforms	  and	  called	  for	  free	  elections.
The	   1999	   elections	   in	   some	  ways	   represented	   a	  
victory	   for	   Islamic	   politics.	   	   While	   the	   secular	  
nationalist	  PDI-­‐P	  and	   Golkar	   emerged	  as	   the	   two	  
largest	   parties,	   the	   next	   Nive	   largest	   parties	  were	  
all	  more	  or	   less	   Islamic,	   and	  managed	  to	   unite	   in	  
order	  to	  form	  a	  government.	  	  Abdurrahman	  Wahid	  
became	   the	   new	   President,	   and	   other	   Islamic	  
leaders	  gained	  notable	  postings.	  	  Wahid	  turned	  out	  
to	   be	   a	   progressive	   reformer,	   defending	  minority	  
rights	  and	  negotiating	  with	  armed	  rebels.	   	  But	  he	  
was	  also	   erratic,	  alienating	  several	  allies,	  and	  was	  
removed	   from	   ofNice	   in	   2001,	   with	   Megawati	  
Sukarnoputri	  becoming	  the	  new	  President.	   	  While	  
female	   leadership	   had	  angered	  Islamic	   leaders	   in	  
1999,	   they	   now	   backed	   Megawati,	   appeased	   by	  
PPP	   leader	   Hamzah	   Haz	   becoming	   her	   Vice	  
President.
In	  retrospect,	  the	  2004	  elections	  marked	  a	  turning	  
point.	   	   Islamic	   parties	   witnessed	   a	   decline	   in	  
electoral	   support,	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	  
Prosperous	   Justice	   Party	   (Partai	   Keadilan	  
Sejahtera),	   an	   Islamist	   party	   based	   loosely	   on	  
Egypt’s	   Muslim	  Brotherhood.	   	   Instead	  of	   running	  
on	  a	  clearly	  Islamist	  platform,	  PKS	  focused	  on	  anti-­‐
corruption,	   gaining	  7.3%	  of	   the	  popular	   vote.	   	   In	  
the	   Presidential	   elections	   held	   months	   later,	  
candidates	   afNiliated	   with	   Islamic	   groups	   fared	  
poorly.	   	  In	  the	  end,	  Susilo	   Bambang	  Yudhoyono,	   a	  
liberal	   former	   general,	   proved	   victorious.	   	   Even	  
voters	   who	   selected	   Islamic	   parties	   in	   the	  
legislative	  elections	  voted	  for	   a	  Presidential	   ticket	  
which	  lacked	  Islamic	  credentials.2
The	   decline	   of	   Islamic	   political	   parties	   became	  
more	   apparent	   in	   the	   2009	   elections.	   	   In	   the	  
legislative	   race,	   Muslim	   parties	   faced	   a	  
considerable	   decline.	   	   The	   only	   Islamic	   party	  
which	  did	  not	  lose	  seats	  was	  PKS.	   	  PKS	  abandoned	  
much	   of	   its	   Islamic	   image	   during	   the	   2009	  
campaign,	  and	  even	  spoke	  out	  in	  favour	  of	  former	  
President	   Suharto.	   	   PKS	   made	   bold	   predictions	  
that	   it	   would	  win	  20%	  of	   the	   vote,	   but	   took	   only	  
7.9%.	   	  The	  combined	  vote	  share	  of	  Islamic	  parties	  
declined	   from	  32%	   to	   24%	  and	   their	   total	   house	  
seats	  declined	  from	  208	  to	  169.	   	  Mujani	  and	  Liddle	  
(2009,	   577)	   show	   that	   60%	   of	   those	   surveyed	  
favour	  “secular”	  parties,	  while	  only	  24%	  of	  people	  
favour	   “Islamist”	   parties	   or	   parties	   “based	   on	  
Islamic	   social	   organizations”.	   	   These	   national	  
trends	  were	  also	  evident	   in	  sub-­‐national	  elections.	  
In	  Aceh,	   one	   of	   Indonesia’s	  most	   pious	   provinces	  
which	   had	   recently	   overcome	   decades	   of	   armed	  
conNlict,	   local	   parties	   were	   allowed	   to	   run	   in	  
provincial	   and	   district	   races.	   	   Two	   of	  Aceh’s	  new	  
local	  parties	  were	  Islamic,	  but	  they	  gained	  only	  2%	  
of	   the	   vote,	   and	   national	   Islamic	   parties	   did	   not	  
fare	  much	  better.	   	   Instead,	   the	   former	   rebels	   and	  
the	   President’s	   party	   dominated	   Aceh’s	   elections	  
(Barter	  2011).
Explaining	  the	  Decline	  of	  Islamic	  Parties
What	   accounts	   for	   this	   change?	   	   One	   must	   start	  
with	   the	   meteoric	   rise	   of	   President	   Yudhoyono’s	  
Democrat	  Party,	  whose	  vote	  share	  rose	  from	  7.5%	  
to	   20.9%.	   	   But	   why	   would	   so	   many	   voters	   who	  
previously	  endorsed	  Islamic	  parties	  now	  support	  a	  
candidate	  lacking	  Islamic	  credentials?
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Mujani	   and	   Liddle	   explain	   what	   they	   refer	   to	   as	  
“secularization”	   in	   terms	  of	  Indonesian	  pluralism,	  
Suharto’s	   state	   Islam,	   the	   growth	   of	   Golkar,	   and	  
moderate	  voters.	   	  But	   the	  Nirst	   two	   factors	   cannot	  
explain	   the	   decline	   of	   Islamic	   parties	   from	  
1999-­‐2009,	  and	  the	  latter	  two	  factors	  are	  evidence	  
of	   this	   change	  
m o r e	   t h a n	  
explanations	  
for	  it.	  	  Instead,	  
it	   seems	   that	  
the	   decline	   of	  
political	   Islam	  
i s	   o w e d	  
largely	   to	   the	  
i n c r e a s i n g	  
acceptance	   of	  
I s l a m	   i n	  
politics	   by	   all	  
parties.	   	   As	  
p r e v i o u s l y	  
s e c u l a r	  
parties	   have	  
t u r n e d	   t o	  
reject	   secular	  
positions	   and	  
incorporate	   some	   elements	   of	   Islam,	   voters	   no	  
longer	   face	   a	   stark	   choice	   between	   religious	   and	  
political	   allegiances.	   	   In	   this	   more	   relaxed	  
atmosphere,	   voters	   have	   turned	   away	   from	  
Islamist	  parties.
Between	  2004	  and	  2009,	   all	  political	  parties,	  even	  
those	  largely	  described	  as	  secular,	  adopted	  Islamic	  
elements.	   	   Candidates	   for	   secular	   parties	  
increasingly	   donned	   Islamic	   dress,	   appointed	  
advisors	   from	   Islamic	  organizations,	   and	  featured	  
Islamic	   symbols	  in	  their	  campaign	  posters	   [Poster	  
One].	   	   Even	   PDI-­‐P—traditionally	   the	   party	   of	  
secular	   Muslims,	   Christians,	   and	   Hindus—ran	  
several	   religious	   campaigns	   and	   established	   an	  
Islamic	   afNiliate	   organization	   [Poster	  Two].	   	   Even	  
small	  Christian	  parties	   featured	  a	  small	  number	  of	  
outwardly	  Muslim	  candidates	   [Poster	   Three].	   	  All	  
parties	   open	   their	   meetings	   and	   rallies	   with	  
prayers	   led	   by	   Islamic	   leaders	   and	   work	   to	  
cultivate	  an	  image	  of	  piety.	   	  Golkar	  and	  PDI-­‐P	  have	  
allied	   with	   Nigures	   from	   Nahdlatul	   Ulama	   and	  
Muhammadiyah,	   depriving	   Islamic	   parties	   of	  
support	   and	   bringing	  
religious	   legitimacy	   to	  
nationalist	   parties.	   	   Far	  
from	   a	   secularization	   of	  
po l i t i c s ,	   t he	   en t i re	  
political	   spectrum	   has	  
shifted	   to	   accept	   a	   role	  
for	   Islam	   in	   politics.	   	   As	  
they	  have	  done	  so,	  voters	  
have	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  
their	   religious	   interests	  
can	   be	   represented	   by	  
n a t i o n a l i s t	   p a r t i e s	  
(Platzdasch	  2009).
Tanuwidjaja	   (2010)	   has	  
come	  to	  a	  similar	  Ninding,	  
noting	  that	  instead	  of	  the	  
demise	   o f	   re l ig ious	  
politics,	   the	   decline	   of	  
Islamic	   parties	   is	   owed	   to	   the	   religiosity	   of	  
mainstream	  parties.	   	   However	   Tanuwidjaja	   is	   led	  
to	   extremely	   different	   conclusions,	   warning	   that	  
the	  decline	  of	  secularism	  led	  to	  parties	  which	  have	  
“shied	  away	  from	  criticizing	  controversial	  religious	  
issues.”	  	  While	  somewhat	  true,	  Tanuwidjaja	  fails	  to	  
note	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   Islamic	   parties	   in	  
government	  has	  also	  muted	  calls	  for	  more	  extreme	  
religious	   policies.	   	   By	   accepting	   Islam	   in	  politics,	  
national	  parties	  have	  halted	  the	  expansion	  of	  PKS,	  
Indonesia’s	   Islamic	   Brotherhood,	   which	   has	  
increasingly	   moderated	   its	   positions.	   	   An	  
alternative	   implication	   of	   mainstream	   parties	  
moving	   towards	   Islam,	   but	   not	   towards	   political	  
Islam,	  is	  that	  elected	  ofNicials	  may	  better	  reNlect	  the	  
interests	   and	   identities	   of	   their	   societies,	   an	  
important	  element	  of	  liberal	  democracy.
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Indonesian	   society	   appears	   to	   want	   Islam	   in	  
politics,	   but	   not	   Islamic	   politics.	   	   This	   may	   well	  
prove	   to	  be	  a	  way	   forward	  for	   Islamicization	  and	  
democratization.	   	   The	   presence	   of	   staunchly	  
secular	   parties	   in	   other	   Muslim-­‐majority	  
countries,	   far	   from	   combating	   radical	   Islam,	   may	  
actually	  enable	  the	  presence	  of	  Islamic	  parties.
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“We	  have	  got	   into	   a	   conNlict	  with	  a	   race	  of	   tigers,	  
and	  it	   is	   only	   by	   treating	  them	  with	  a	  rod	  of	   iron	  
that	   they	   will	   ever	   give	   in.”[1]	   These	   were	   the	  
words	   of	  General	   Sir	   Charles	  Metcalfe	  MacGregor,	  
an	   ofNicer	   with	   the	   British	   Army	   invading	  
Afghanistan	  in	  1878.	   	  American	  neocolonialism	   in	  
Afghanistan	   possesses	   a	   cultural	   genealogy	   that	  
traces	   back	   to	   the	   British	   invasions	   of	   1839	   and	  
1878.	   	   A	   brief	   recapitulation	   of	   British	   attitudes	  
t owa r d	   A f g h a n	   g e n d e r	  
relations	   suggest	   the	   probable	  
t r a j e c t o r y	   o f	   f u t u r e	  
neocolonialist	   cooption	   of	  
women’s	   rights	   issues	   in	  
s e e k i n g	   t o	   d o m i n a t e	  
Afghanistan	   without	   direct	  
military	  force.	  	  
R e s i s t a n c e	   t o	   t h i s	  
neocolonialism	   must	   remain	  
wary	  of	  attempts	  to	  market	  the	  
conNlict	   in	  humanitarian	  terms.	  
During	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   the	   patronizing	  
views	   of	   British	   ethnographers	   and	   historians	  
toward	   gender	   relations	   in	   Afghanistan	   infused	  
efforts	   to	   control	   the	   frontier	   tribes.	   	   Demeaning	  
por t raya l s	   o f	   A fghan	   gender	   re l a t ions	  
strengthened	   notions	   that	   Afghans	   were	   an	  
uncivilized	  people	  that	  had	  to	  be	  contained	  within	  
manageable	   borders.	   	   This	   culminated	   in	   the	  
creation	  of	  the	  Durand	  Line	  in	  1893,	  which	  divided	  
the	   Pashtun	   homeland	   over	   the	   objections	   of	  
Abdur	  Rahman.[2]	  Disdain	  toward	  Afghan	  gender	  
relations	   infused	   Britain’s	   imperialist	   ventures	   in	  
Afghanistan.[3]	   British	  sketches	  of	  Afghan	  gender	  
relations	   augmented	   British	   cultural	   power	   over	  
the	   peoples	   of	   Afghanistan.	   	   The	   speciNic	  
descriptions	   varied	   according	   to	   the	   particular	  
ethnic	   group,	   but	   all	   created	   interstitial	   space	  
which	  privileged	  British	  dominance.
British	   imperial	   discourse	   on	   Afghanistan	   in	   the	  
nineteenth	   century	   shifted	   several	   times	   in	  
response	   to	   Afghan	   resistance:	   	   depictions	   of	  
Afghan	   culture	   became	   markedly	   more	   favorable	  
as	   British	   commentators	   grudgingly	   conceded	  
Afghan	   military	   prowess.[4]	   However,	   portrayals	  
of	  gender	  roles	   in	  Afghanistan	  remained	  constant,	  
structuring	   the	   power	   of	   British	   imperialism	   in	  
South	  Asia.	   	   Part	   of	  what	   the	  British	   regarded	  as	  
the	   most	   basic	   components	   of	   native	   life,	  
Representations	  of	  gender	  relations	  among	  Afghan	  
ethnic	  groups	  and	  tribes	  infused	  the	  imperial	   self-­‐
image,	   insulating	   its	   power	  
from	   the	   emasculating	  
effects	   of	  battleNield	  defeat	  
i n	   A f g h a n i s t a n	   a n d	  
domestic	  regime	  change.
Several	   representative	  
types	  appear	  in	  nineteenth	  
century	   British	  writing	   on	  
Afghanis tan .	   	   These	  
include	   the	   Afghan	   man,	  
A f g h a n	   woman ,	   a n d	  
A f g h a n	   c h i l d r e n .	  
Ethnographic	   studies	   further	   delineate	   particular	  
gender	   relations	   among	   Sunni,	   Shi’a	   (usually	  
Pa sh t un	   a nd	   Ha z a ra	   t r i b e s ) ,	   a nd	   t h e	  
“KaNir”	   (“inNidel”)	   tribes	   of	   Afghanistan.[5]	   In	  
British	   portrayals,	   gender	   roles	   within	   these	  
ethnic,	   tribal,	   and	   religious	   communities	  
overlapped	   and	   intermingled	   with	   depictions	   of	  
political	  identity.	   In	  British	  imperial	  discourse,	   this	  
admixture	   reinforced	   British	   cultural	   self-­‐image	  
and	   gave	   power	   to	   efforts	   at	   dominating	  
Afghanistan	  from	  outside	  the	  country.
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The	  common	  themes	  among	  depictions	  of	  gender	  
roles	   among	   the	   various	   Afghan	   communities	  
enabled	   British	   essentialization	   of	   racial,	   ethnic,	  
and	   religious	   traits,	   thereby	   reifying	   British	  
cultural,	   sexual,	   and	  political	   superiority.	  Strategic	  
identiNication	  of	   differences	  meanwhile	   facilitated	  
the	  divide-­‐and-­‐conquer	   imperial	   tactics	  which	  the	  
British	   used	   during	   the	   Anglo-­‐Afghan	   Wars	   of	  
1839	   and	   1878.	   	   After	   invasion	   failed,	   these	  
perceptions	   of	   Afghan	   gender	   relations	   provided	  
the	   cultural	   backbone	   of	   British	   political	  
domination	   over	   Afghanistan	   and	   the	   regime	   of	  
Abdur	  Rahman.	  	  This	  supremacy	  endured	  until	  the	  
third	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  War	  of	  1919.
The	   deployment	   of	   cultural	   superiority	   from	   the	  
arsenal	   of	   imperialism	   in	   the	   region	   during	   the	  
nineteenth	   century	   is	   familiar	   to	   historians.	   	   In	  
their	   essay,	   “Baloch	   Tribalism	   and	   British	  
Imperialism	   (1800-­‐1887):	   the	  ConNlict	  of	   Identity,	  
Authority,	   and	   Sovereignty,”	   Muhammad	   Bhatti	  
and	   Lubna	   Kanwal	   have	   noted	   how	   British	  
observation	   of	   Baluchi	   tribal	   society	   infused	  
Britain’s	  political	  claims	  and	  informed	  its	   imperial	  
tactics	   in	  the	  region.[6]	   In	  Frontier	  of	  Faith:	   Islam	  
in	   the	   Indo-­‐Afghan	  Borderland,	   Sana	  Haroon	   has	  
similarly	   observed	   how	   the	   British	   mobilized	  
ethnographic	   understandings	   of	   the	   Pashtun	  
region	   (spanning	   the	   present-­‐day	   border	   with	  
Pakistan)	  in	  formulating	  policy	  and	  constructing	  a	  
frontier	  for	  British	  India.[7]
Some	   scholars	   have	   criticized	   historians’	   reliance	  
on	  Western	  ethnography	   for	   cultural	   information	  
on	   Afghan	   peoples.	   	   One	   objection	   is	   that	   such	  
writings	  provide	  static	  snapshots	  of	  Afghan	  society	  
and	  lack	   the	  Nlexibility	  to	   reveal	   change	  over	  time.
[8]	  Such	  criticism	   is	  of	  course	  moot	  when	  it	  is	  the	  
Western	   perceptions	   that	   are	   of	   interest,	   rather	  
than	   the	   actual	   character	   of	   Afghan	   society.	   	   In	  
addition,	   these	   perceptions	   exerted	   tangible	  
inNluence	  upon	  British	  policies	  toward	  Afghanistan	  
in	   the	   nineteenth	  century.	   They	   therefore	   remain	  
important	  even	  if	  their	  information	  is	  not	  entirely	  
accurate.
Limited	   space	   precludes	   a	   comprehensive	  
overview	   of	   the	   variegated	   representation	   of	  
gender	   within	   British	   portrayals	   of	   Afghan	  
communities,	   Muslim	   and	   non-­‐Muslim.	   	   Such	  
depictions	   were	   universally	   derogatory,	   variously	  
stressing	   sexual	   depravity,	   and	   exoticism,	  
repulsiveness,	   and	   inequality,	   regardless	   of	   the	  
observer’s	   political	   views	   on	   British	   intervention	  
in	   Afghanistan.	   	   ReafNirming	   Edward	   Said’s	  
illustrations	   in	   Orientalism	   and	   Culture	   and	  
Imperialism,	   all	   of	   these	   accounts	   emphasize	   the	  
cultural	   inferiority	  of	  a	  Muslim	  country	  to	  those	  of	  
the	  West.[9]	   The	   journal	   of	   Dr.	   John	   Alfred	   Gray	  
highlights	   sexual	   depravity,	   as	   an	   integral	  
component	   of	   Afghan	   backwardness.	   Gray	   was	   a	  
British	  medical	  doctor,	  who	  served	  for	  Nive	  years	  as	  
a	  surgeon	  at	  the	  court	  of	  Amir	  Abdur	  Rahman.[10]	  
During	  Gray’s	   stay	  at	  the	  Amir’s	  court,	   a	  common	  
soldier	   in	   Kabul	   had	   a	   (implicitly	   sexual)	   liaison	  
with	  a	  young	   boy.	   	  Upon	  discovering	   that	  the	  boy	  
had	   “associated	   with	   another	   man,”	   the	   soldier	  
murdered	  him.	  	  The	  boy’s	  mother	  brought	  the	  case	  
to	   the	   Amir,	   who	   permitted	   the	   woman	   to	   take	  
revenge,	   “according	  to	   the	  Afghan	  law	   (an	  eye	   for	  
an	  eye	  and	  a	  tooth	  for	  a	  tooth)	  .	   .	   .	   .”	   	  After	  cutting	  
the	   man’s	   throat	   with	   a	   knife,	   she	   cupped	   her	  
hands	  beneath	  the	  spurting	  blood	  and	  lapped	  it	  up	  
with	  relish.[11]
Henry	  Bellew,	   a	   proliNic	  Orientalist	  writer,	   Bengal	  
Medical	   Service	   doctor	   and	   veteran	  of	   numerous	  
expeditions	   in	   Afghanistan	   wrote	   that	   Pashtun	  
Yusufzai	   men,	   “though	   so	   jealous	   of	   [wives,	  
daughters,	  and	  sisters]	  treat	   their	  women	  with	  no	  
respect	   or	   conNidence,	   but	   look	   on	   them	   as	   so	  
much	   property	   in	   which	   their	   honor	   is	  
invested	   .	   .	   .	   .”[12]	   J.	   P.	   Ferrier	   asserted	   that	   the	  
Afghans	   were	   less	   “fanatical”	  prior	   to	   the	  British	  
invasion	  of	  1839,	  “but	  as	  a	  set	  off	  they	  are	  the	  most	  
covetous	   on	   earth,	   and	   the	   result	   was	   that	   the	  
women	  soon	  gave	  themselves	  up	  to	  the	  English	  for	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money,	   even	  with	   the	   consent	   of	  their	   husbands.”	  
Josiah	   Harlan’s	   memoirs,	   while	   more	   respectful	  
towards	  Afghan	  women—especially	   those	   of	  high	  
social	   rank—resounds	  with	  the	  familiar	   exoticism	  
that	   presupposed	   Western	   superiority	   over	   the	  
Orient.[13]
The	   l ink	   between	   such	  
attitudes	  and	   the	  nineteenth-­‐
century	   British	   treatment	   of	  
Afghanistan	   bears	   l i tt le	  
repeating:	   Afghan	   Muslims	  
were	  widely	  held	  to	  be	  among	  
the	   most	   uncivilized	   peoples	  
of	   the	   world	   and	   their	  
treatment	  of	  women	  provided	  
(ostensibly)	   ample	   evidence.	  
It	   was	   also	   an	   open	   secret	  
among	   British	   ofNicers	   and	  
staff	  during	  the	  Anglo-­‐Afghan	  
Wars	   tha t	   the	   cu l tura l	  
intelligence	   provided	   by	  
ethnographers	   and	   travelers	  
such	   as	   Bellew,	   Ferrier,	   and	  
Harlan	   informed	   British	  
military	   and	   political	   efforts	  
to	   create	   a	   buffer	   zone	   for	  
India	   at	   Afghan	   expense.[14]	   Therefore,	   the	  
looming	   danger	   confronting	   Western	   prognoses	  
for	  Afghan	  social	   development	   is	   that	  the	   relative	  
standing	   of	  Afghan	   women	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   those	   of	   the	  
Occident	  will	   continue	  to	   be	  taken	   as	   evidence	  of	  
Afghan	  political	  maturity.	  	  Ultimately,	   it	  is	  up	  to	  the	  
Afghans,	   in	  all	  their	  religious,	  ethnic,	  and	  linguistic	  
diversity,	   to	   decide	   on	   the	   structures	   of	   their	  
society	   and	   government.	   	   David	   Loyn	   has	  
emphasized	   that	   Afghans	   well	   remember	   foreign	  
attempts	  to	  impose	  rulers	  on	  Afghanistan,[15]	  and	  
the	   reason	   for	   such	   hostility	   is	   the	   anticipated	  
social,	  cultural,	  and	  religious	  coercion	  that	  political	  
domination	   necessarily	   involves.	   	   Noting	   the	  
failure	   of	   nation-­‐building	   in	   Afghanistan,	   Ahmed	  
Rashid	   has	   called	   for	   increased	   synergy	   between	  
the	   international	   community	   and	   Afghans	   in	  
rebuilding	  a	  better	  country.	   	  Citing	  the	  RAND	  think	  
tank,	  Rashid	  also	  stresses	  that	   the	  funding	  behind	  
rebuilding	  efforts	  has	  made	  it	  “the	  least-­‐resourced	  
American	   nat ion-­‐bui lding	   ef fort	   in	   our	  
history.”[16]
I n	   v i ew	   o f	   t h i s ,	   wh i l e	  
searching	   for	  solutions	   to	   the	  
array	  of	  economic,	   social,	   and	  
political	  problems	  confronting	  
Afghanistan,	   great	   caution	  
must	   be	   exercised	   so	   as	   to	  
prevent	   manipulation	   of	   the	  
i s s u e s ,	   i n	   a	   m o r e	  
humanitarian-­‐sounding	  yet	  all	  
the	   more	   insidious	   form	   of	  
neocolonialism.	   	   The	   link	  
between	  gender	  relations	   and	  
relations	   of	   power	   is	   subtle	  
and	   indirect.	   	   The	   same	  
assumption	   of	   the	   cultural	  
inferiority	   of	   Afghan	   gender	  
re la t ions	   prompted	   the	  
British	  to	  view	  Abdur	  Rahman	  
as	   “our	   paid	   servant.”[17]	   As	  
Loyn	  has	   pointed	  out,	   similar	  
assertions	   have	   already	   been	   made	   concerning	  
Hamid	   Karzai.[18]	   The	   United	   States’	   occupation	  
appears	   to	   be	   coming	   to	   an	   unsurprisingly	  
controversial	   close.	   	   The	  pressing	   question	   is	   no	  
longer	   how	   long	   American	   troops	  will	   remain	   in	  
Afghanistan	   but	   the	   future	   of	  gender	   relations	   as	  
the	   rod	   with	  which	   the	   U.S.	   and	   its	   allies	   try	   to	  
tame	   the	   tiger	   when	   the	   rod	   of	   iron	   fails.	   	   The	  
genealogy	   of	   American	   neocolonialism	   in	  
Afghanistan	   suggests	   that	   even	   after	   the	  
occupation	   ends,	   efforts	   to	   dominate	   via	   more	  
subtle	   means	   will	   continue.	   	   The	   pressing	  
challenge	  that	  rebuilding	  Afghanistan	  will	  confront	  
is	   constructing	   a	   program	   for	   social	   change—
particularly	   the	   improvement	   of	   women’s	   lives—
that	  resists	  neocolonialist	  co-­‐optation.
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Arriving	   in	   post-­‐tsunami/post-­‐conNlict	   Aceh	   for	  
the	   Nirst	   time,	   I	   was	  enamored	  with	   the	  potential	  
for	   radial	   social	   and	   political	   change	   that	   was	   in	  
the	   air	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   provincial	   elections	   in	  
2009 .	   As	   par t	   o f	   the	   Memorandum	   o f	  
Understanding	   (Helsinki	   MoU)	   signed	   in	   2005	  
between	   the	   former	   separatists	   group	   the	   Free	  
Aceh	   Movement	   (Gerakan	   Aceh	   Merdeka,	   GAM)	  
and	   the	   central	   government	   of	   the	   Republic	   of	  
Indonesia	  (RI),	   Aceh	  became	  the	  Nirst	  province	   in	  
the	   country	   to	   have	   provincially	   based	   political	  
parties.	  While	  only	   six	   parties	  were	   able	   to	   fulNill	  
all	   of	   the	   requirements	   in	   enough	   time	   to	   run,	   it	  
was	  a	  very	  exciting	  time	  to	  be	  in	  Aceh.	  Having	  local	  
political	  parties	  is	  a	  concrete	  step	  towards	  greater	  
self-­‐governance	   that	   the	   Acehnese	   people	   had	  
been	   Nighting	   for	   since	   1976.	   Adding	   to	   the	  
excitement	   of	   the	   latest	   election,	   Indonesia’s	  
electoral	   laws	   had	   been	   recently	   changed	   to	  
include	   a	   provision	   that	   a	   minimum	   of	   thirty-­‐
percent	   of	   each	   political	   party’s	   candidates	   must	  
be	   women.	   Although	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  
gender	   quota	   was	   not	   accompanied	   by	   a	   strict	  
penalty	   for	   parties	   who	   failed	   to	   achieve	   it,	   the	  
gender	   quota	   is	   of	   special	   interest	   for	   Aceh	  
because	  of	  the	  province’s	  tradition	  of	  matrifocality.	  
Historically,	  women	  in	  Aceh	  have	  always	  played	  an	  
active	   role	   in	   public	   life,	   including	   during	   the	  
period	   of	  conNlict.	   Given	   the	  history	  of	  matrifocal	  
traditions	   that	  Aceh	  is	  known	  for,	   it	  might	  be	  safe	  
to	   assume	   that	   women	   in	   Aceh	   could	   potentially	  
utilize	   this	   election	  through	   local	   political	  parties	  
to	   gain	   a	   foothold	   in	   the	   power	   vacuum	   of	   an	  
emerging	   ‘new	   Aceh’.	   	   Therefore,	   I	   found	   it	  
surprising	  that	  none	  of	  the	  six	  local	  parties	  in	  Aceh	  
were	  able	   to	  meet	   the	  thirty-­‐percent	  quota,	   while	  
all	   of	   the	   established	   national	   parties	   had	   no	  
problems	   meeting	   the	   quota.	   More	   importantly	  
than	  the	  lack	  of	  apparent	  correlation	  between	  the	  
matrifocal	   tradition	   and	   the	   number	   of	   women	  
running	   as	   candidates,	   the	   low	   rate	   of	   women	  
political	   participation	   needs	   to	   be	   scrutinized	  
because	   it	   potentially	   signals	   the	   lack	   of	   the	  
parties’	  priority	  in	  promoting	  gender	  equality.
Each	   of	   local	   party’s	   platforms	   centered	   on	  
developing	   Aceh’s	   economic,	   social,	   and	   political	  
autonomy	  from	  Jakarta	  and	  I	  am	  aware	  of	  only	  two	  
local	   parties	   that	   had	   explicit	   policy	   goals	   to	  
promoting	   gender	   equality.	   I	   found	   troubling	   the	  
lack	   of	   acknowledgment	   of	   the	   importance	   of	  
gender	   equality	   because	   women	   played	   a	   very	  
critical	   role	   in	   the	   conNlict	   that	   immediately	  
preceded	  the	  peace	  agreement.	  Their	  role	  included	  
participating	   in	   armed	   combat	   (inong	   baleé,	  
widows/combatants)	   to	   Nilling	   critical	   roles	   of	  
providing	  food	  and	  Ninancial	  support.	  Additionally,	  
women	   faced	   dangers	   of	   sexual	   assault,	   torture,	  
and	  rape	  for	  their	  contributions	  during	  the	  conNlict	  
and	   after	   the	   end	   of	   the	   conNlict,	   as	   a	   group	   of	  
inong	   baleé	   described	   it,	   ‘women	   in	   GAM	   were	  
expected	  to	  leave	  the	  political	  and	  economic	  spoils	  
of	  the	  peace	  to	  the	  men’	  (interview	  in	  Aceh,	  2010).	  
All	   of	   the	   women	   in	   this	   group	   described	   GAM	  
during	  the	  conNlict	  as	  being	  basically	  egalitarian	  in	  
that	   the	   contributions	   of	   women	   were	   valued	  
similarly	   to	   those	   of	   men.	   Despite	   the	   women’s	  
critical	   role	   during	   the	   conNlict,	   the	   political	  
process	   in	   Aceh	   appeared	   to	   be	   dominated	   by	   a	  
male	  agenda.	  	  
After	  meeting	  with	  local	  party	  ofNicials,	  candidates,	  
and	  local	   activists,	   it	   became	  clear	   to	   me	  that	   the	  
local	   parties	   no	   longer	   seemed	   to	   be	   a	   probable	  
location	   for	   women	   empowerment	   in	   Aceh.	   The	  
Aceh	   Party	   (Parti	   Aceh),	   founded	   by	   GAM	  
members,	   became	  the	  Nirst	  and	  only	   local	  party	  to	  
win	  enough	  votes	  to	  meet	  the	  minimum	  electoral
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threshold	   in	   the	   2009	   elections.	   Out	   of	   the	   few	  
women	   candidates	   that	   ran	   for	   the	   Aceh	   Party,	  
only	   a	   fraction	   of	   them	   were	   elected.	   What	   can	  
possibly	  account	  for	  the	   lack	  of	  gender	  equality	   in	  
the	   electoral	   process	   in	  Aceh?	   Are	  women	   being	  
systematically	   excluded	   from	   politics	   in	   Aceh?	  
Although	   I	   will	   only	   begin	   to	   address	   these	  
questions	   given	   the	   limited	   space	   of	   this	   article,	  
they	   are	   worth	   being	   investigated	   in-­‐depth	   in	  
future	   works.	   In	   order	   to	   begin	   address	   these	  
questions,	   I	   will	   present	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   the	  
history	  of	  Aceh	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  on	  the	  role	  
of	  women	  in	  its	  society.	  
The	   province	   of	   Aceh	   is	   located	   on	   the	   North-­‐
Western	  corner	  of	  the	  Republic	  of	  Indonesia	  on	  the	  
island	  of	  Sumatra	  and	  has	  a	  historical	   tradition	  of	  
both	  matrifocality	   and	   Islam	   for	   at	   least	   the	  past	  
Nive	   centuries.	   It	   is	   still	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	  
‘Mecca’s	   veranda’	   (serambi	   Mekkah),	   because	  
many	   believe	   that	   the	   Nirst	   indigenous	   Muslim	  
community	   in	   Southeast	   Asia	   was	   established	   in	  
what	  is	  now	  Aceh	  (Riddell	  2006).	  While	  the	  origins	  
of	   the	   growth	   of	   Islam	   across	   Southeast	   Asia	   are	  
difNicult	   to	   trace,	   the	  deep	   roots	   of	  Islamic	   values	  
and	  norms	  have	   become	  an	  important	  part	  of	   an	  
Acehnese	   identity	   today	   (Aspinall	   2009,	   pp.	  
23-­‐24).	   The	  history	   of	  Islam	   in	  Aceh	  is	   Nilled	  with	  
cases	   of	   women	   holding	   leadership	   positions	   as	  
exempliNied	  by	  the	  four	  successive	  Sultanas	  in	  the	  
17th	  century	   that	  marked	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  women’s	  
political	   power	   in	   Aceh’s	   pre-­‐colonial	   history.	  
Other	   important	  roles	  of	  women	  in	  Aceh’s	  history	  
included	   judges,	   a	   naval	   commander,	   and	   folk	  
heroines	  who	  fought	  the	  Dutch.	  The	  importance	  of	  
women	   in	   Aceh’s	   history	   had	   been	   thoroughly	  
documented	  by	   early	  Dutch	  historians	  who	   noted	  
the	   custom	   of	  women	   in	   Aceh	   as	   the	   traditional	  
owners	  of	  the	   family’s	   house	  as	  well	  as	  women	  in	  
Aceh	   leading	   guerilla	   attacks	   against	   the	   Dutch	  
during	   the	   latter’s	   colonial	   occupation	   of	   Aceh	  
(Reid	   1988;	   Siapno	   2002).	   It	   is	   important	   to	  
recognize,	   however,	   that	   even	   though	   the	  
signiNicance	  of	  women	  in	  Acehnese	  history	  is	  well-­‐
documented,	   the	   history	   in	   large	   part	   has	   been	  
written	   from	   a	   patriarchal	   perspective	   until	   very	  
recently	  (Siapno	  2002;	   Tanner	  1974).	  This	   is	   due,	  
in	   part,	   to	   the	   majority	   of	   scholars	   who	   wrote	  
anthropological	   accounts	  of	  Aceh’s	  history	   from	  a	  
male-­‐centered	   perspective,	   including	   Snouck	  
Hurgronje	   (1906),	   Anthony	   Reid	   (1969,	   1988),	  
James	   Siegel	   (1969),	   and	   Chandra	   Jayawardena	  
(1977)	   (Siapno	   2002	   pp.	   60-­‐61).The	   patriarchal	  
bias	   in	   their	  works	  can	  be	   seen	   in	   their	   tendency	  
to	   underplay	   the	   importance	  of	  women	   in	   Aceh’s	  
history.	  For	  example,	  Siapno	  (2002)	  problematized	  
the	   way	   Reid	   (1969,	   1988)	   analyzed	   the	   four	  
Acehnese	   Sultanas	   (from	   1641	   to	   1699).	   In	   his	  
early	  works,	  Reid	  portrayed	  the	  Sultanas	  as	  having	  
no	   real	   political	   power	   and	   consequently	  
contributing	   to	   the	   decline	   of	   the	   power	   of	   the	  
Acehnese	  Sultanate	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  17th	   century.	  
In	   contrast	   to	   Reid’s	   analysis,	   Siapno	   argued	  
following	  Mernissi	  (1993)	  that	  the	  Sultanas’	  reigns	  
were	   successful.	   Additionally,	   Siapno	   argued	   that	  
the	   success	   of	   the	   Sultanas	   were	   more	   notable	  
because	   they	   had	   faced	   opposition	   from	   their	  
political	   enemies	  who	   opposed	   a	  women	   Sultana	  
and	   went	   to	   so	   far	   as	   to	   request	   a	   fatwa	   from	  
Mecca	   declaring	   the	   illegality	   of	   a	   women’s	   rule	  
(Siapno	   2002,	   p.	   51).	   Siapno	   argues	   that	   a	   closer	  
analysis	  of	  early	  Acehnese	  literature,	  including	  the	  
Hikayat	  Aceh,	  reveals	  that	  many	  of	  the	  translations	  
of	  the	  texts	  superimpose	  gender	  onto	  characters	  in	  
the	   story	   when	   the	   text	   itself	   is	   gender	   neutral	  
(pronouns	  are	  not	  gender	  speciNic	   in	  old	  Malay)	  or	  
at	   times	   clearly	   referring	   to	   a	   female	   character	  
while	  being	  translated	  as	  a	  male	  (Siapno	  2002,	  pp.	  
72-­‐82).	  
The	   gender	   bias	   against	   positive	   accounts	   of	  
women’s	  political	  role	  and	  agency	  that	  continue	  to	  
plague	  the	  historiography	  of	  Aceh	  may	  provide	  us	  
with	   a	   possible	   explanation	   of	   the	   current	  
manifestation	   of	   gender	   inequality	   in	   Acehnese	  
society.	   The	   distortion	   and	   manipulation	   of	   the	  
historical	   discourse	   of	  women	  may	   have	   had	   an	  
effect	  on	  the	  current	  discourse	  that	  I	  observed	  that	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women	  in	  Aceh	  somehow	  are,	  “lacking	  capacity”	  to	  
be	  viable	  political	   candidates.	   In	   January	  2009	   in	  
the	   run	   up	   to	   the	   elections,	   I	   speciNically	   asked	  
everyone	   I	   interviewed	   in	   Aceh	   to	   explain	   what	  
they	   thought	   was	   the	   reason	  why	   there	   were	   so	  
few	   women	   candidates	   in	   the	   local	   parties.	   Over	  
and	  over	  again,	   I	   heard	   the	  same	  phrase	   ‘lacking	  
capacity’	  used	  to	   explain	   why	   there	   were	   so	   few	  
women	  candidates.	  An	  analysis	  of	  the	  gender	  bias	  
in	   the	   historiography	   of	  Aceh	  provides	   us	  with	   a	  
perspective	   that	   considers	   how	   a	   discourse	   on	  
Aceh	  that	   is	  created	  by	  outsiders	  (in	  this	  case	  the	  
Western	  educated	  scholars)	  can	  affect	  the	  way	  the	  
people	   in	   Aceh	   perceives	   their	   own	   history	   and	  
consequently	  themselves.
Another	  discourse	   that	  needs	   to	   be	  scrutinized	  in	  
terms	  of	  its	  possible	  effect	  on	  gender	  inequality	  in	  
Aceh	   is	   the	   discourse	   over	   Islam,	   Islamic	  
fundamentalism,	   and	   speciNically	   on	   the	  
implementation	   of	   syariah	   law.	   As	   demonstrated	  
in	   the	   aforementioned	   example	   of	   the	   Sultanas	  
who	   faced	  opposition	   from	   those	  who	   would	   use	  
Islam	   to	   undermine	   the	   Sultana’s	   legitimacy,	  
Acehnese	  customs	  and	  traditions	  have	  provided	  a	  
more	  egalitarian	  approach	  to	  the	  role	  of	  women	  in	  
Islam.	   This	   unique	   approach,	   however,	   may	   very	  
well	  be	  under	  attack	  given	  the	  current	  patriarchal	  
interpretations	  of	  syariah	  being	  implementation	  in	  
certain	  regencies	  in	  Aceh.	  The	  national	  call	  for	  the	  
implementation	  of	  syariah	   in	  Aceh	  began	  in	  1999	  
with	   the	   announcement	   from	   interim	   president	  
Habibie	  who	  proclaimed	  that	   the	  province	  would	  
be	   granted	   syariah	   by	   the	   national	   government.	  
The	   use	   of	   the	   term	   syariah	   has	   led	   to	   several	  
misconceptions	   and	   inaccuracies	   by	   academics,	  
journalists,	  activists,	  and	  politicians	  (Bowen	  2003,	  
p.	  14).	   Although	  the	  term	   syariah	  was	  declared	  by	  
the	   governor	   of	   Aceh	   in	   2000	   as	   what	   the	  
provincial	   government	   will	   “develop,	   guide,	   and	  
oversee	   the	   application”	   and	   in	   2002	  was	   signed	  
into	   law	   (Bowen	   2003,	   p.	   15),	   syariah	   was	   also	  
being	  used	  as	  a	  justiNication	  for	  what	  Siapno	  labels	  
razia	   jilbab,	   or	   forced	  veiling,	   as	   a	   form	   of	   street	  
harassment	   that	   took	   place	   sporadically	   in	   1999	  
(Siapno	  2002,	  pp.	  36-­‐38).	  
Siapno	  explains	   the	  turn	  away	   from	  a	   tradition	  of	  
‘Islamic	   liberalism’	  as	  a	   result	   of	  the	   sexualization	  
and	  brutalization	  of	  women	  during	  the	  conAlict	  and	  
the	   ulema’s	   silence	   on	   the	   issue	   after	   the	   razia	  
jilbab	   began	   in	   1999	   (pp.	   38-­‐39).	   I	   argue,	   in	  
agreement	  with	  Siapno,	   in	  favor	  of	  the	  tradition	  of	  
localized	   Islamic	   liberalism	   in	   Aceh’s	   as	   a	   more	  
appropriate	   approach	   to	   Islam	   in	   Aceh.	  
Fur thermore ,	   I	   a rgue	   tha t	   the	   key	   to	  
understanding	   the	   apparent	   lack	   of	   gender	  
equality	   in	   politics	   is	   to	   understand	   the	   current	  
implementation	   of	   syariah	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	  
discourse	  by	  the	  central	  government	  of	  ostracizing	  
the	   tradition	   of	   Islamic	   liberalism	   in	   Aceh	   in	   an	  
attempt	   to	   destabilize	   an	   Acehnese	   national	  
identity.	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A	   Dissenting	   Voice	   on	   Pakistan’s	   Blasphemy	  
Law
	  
Yoginder	  Sikand	  -­	  ysikand@gmail.com	  
In	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   dastardly	   killing	   of	   Salman	  
Taseer,	  governor	  of	  Pakistan’s	  Punjab	  province,	  for	  
having	   dared	   to	   question	   Pakistan’s	   draconian	  
anti-­‐blasphemy	   law,	   scores	   of	   Pakistani	   ‘Islamic’	  
outNits	   celebrated	   the	   crime	   by	   showering	  
encomiums	   on	   the	  man’s	  murderer,	   insisting	   that	  
his	  action	  was	  perfectly	  in	  consonance	  with	  (their	  
understanding	   of)	   Islam.	   They	   feted	   him	   as	   an	  
intrepid	   Islamic	   hero,	   a	   ghazi	   or	   warrior	   of	   the	  
faith.	  Across	  the	  border,	  not	  a	  single	  Indian	  Muslim	  
religious	   organization	  condemned	  the	  attack.	  This	  
might	   well	   suggest	   that	   they	   shared	   the	  
enthusiasm	   of	   their	   Pakistani	   counterparts,	  
although,	   for	  obvious	  reasons,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  
openly	   express	   their	   delight	   at	   the	   deadly	   event.	  
Probably	  the	  only	  Islamic	  scholar	  of	  note	  on	  either	  
side	   of	  the	   border	   to	   have	   condemned	  the	   brutal	  
murder	  in	  no	  uncertain	  terms,	  and	  to	  have	  insisted	  
that	   it	   had	   no	   sanction	  whatsoever	   in	  Islam,	   was	  
the	  New	   Delhi-­‐based	  Maulana	  Wahiduddin	  Khan.	  
He	   immediately	   responded	   to	   the	   murder	   in	   an	  
article	   published	   in	   the	   Times	   of	   India,	   insisting	  
that	   the	   punishment	   of	   death	   for	   blasphemy,	   as	  
prescribed	   in	   Pakistan’s	   anti-­‐blasphemy	   law,	   had	  
no	  sanction	  in	  Islam	  at	  all.	  
Khan’s	   views	   on	   the	   appropriate	   Islamic	  
punishment	   for	   blasphemy,	   particularly	   for	  
de faming	   the	   Prophet	   Muhammad ,	   a re	  
diametrically	  opposed	  to	  those	  of	  the	  mullahs	  and	  
doctrinaire	  Islamists,	  which	  is	  one	  reason	  why	  the	  
latter	   so	   passionately	   detest	   him.	   He	   does	   not	  
condone	   blasphemy,	   even	   in	   the	   name	   of	   free	  
speech,	  of	  course,	  but	  nor	  does	  he	  agree	  with	  those	  
Muslims	  who	  insist	  that	  Islam	  prescribes	  the	  death	  
penalty	   for	   those	   guilty	   of	   it.	   He	   Nirst	   articulated	  
his	  position	  on	  the	  subject	  in	  a	  book	  titled	  Shatim-­‐
e	   Rasul	   Ka	  Masla:	   Quran	  wa	   Hadith	   aur	   Fiqh	  wa	  
Tarikh	  ki	  Raushni	   Mai	   (‘Defaming	   the	  Prophet:	   In	  
the	  Light	  of	  the	  Quran,	  Hadith,	  Fiqh	  and	  History’).	  
The	   book,	   consisting	   of	   a	   number	   of	   articles	  
penned	   in	   the	   wake	   of	   the	   massive	   controversy	  
that	   shook	   the	   world	   over	   the	   publication	   of	  
Salman	   Rushdie’s	   infamous	   Satanic	   Verses,	   was	  
published	  in	  1997.	   It	   is	  a	  powerful	  critique,	   using	  
Islamic	   arguments,	   of	   the	   strident	   anti-­‐Rushdie	  
agitation	   and	   of	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   Islamic	  
punishment	   for	   blasphemy	   is	   death.	   Although	  
Khan	   condemned	   the	   Satanic	   Verses	   as	  
blasphemous,	   he	   argued	   that	   stirring	   up	   Muslim	  
passions	   and	   baying	   for	   Rushdie’s	   blood	   was	  
neither	   the	   rational	   nor	   the	  properly	   Islamic	  way	  
of	   countering	   the	   book	   and	   its	   author.	   Death	   for	  
blasphemy,	   he	   contended,	   using	   references	   from	  
the	   Quran	   and	   the	   corpus	   of	   Hadith	   to	   back	   his	  
stance,	  was	  not	  prescribed	  in	  Islam,	   in	  contrast	  to	  
what	  Iran’s	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  and,	  echoing	  him,	  
millions	  of	  Muslims	  worldwide,	  ardently	  believed.	  
Khan	  was	  possibly	  one	  of	  the	  only	  Islamic	  scholars	  
to	   forcefully	   condemn	   the	   death	   sentence	   on	  
Rushdie	   that	   Khomeini	   had	   announced	   and	   that	  
vast	   numbers	   of	   Muslims,	   Shias	   and	   Sunnis,	  
imagined	   was	   their	   religious	   duty	   to	   fulNill.	  
Although	  his	  book	  deals	  speciNically	  with	  the	  issue	  
of	   blaspheming	   the	   Prophet	   in	  the	   context	  of	   the	  
anti-­‐Rushdie	  agitation,	  it	  is	  of	  immediate	  relevance	  
to	   the	   ongoing	   debate	   about	   the	   anti-­‐blasphemy	  
laws	   and	   the	   violence	   it	   engenders	   in	   Pakistan	  
today.	   What	   is	   particularly	   fascinating	   about	   the	  
book	   is	   that	   it	   uses	   Islamic	   arguments	   to	   counter	  
the	  widespread	  belief	  among	  Muslims	  that	  death	  is	  
the	  punishment	  laid	  down	  in	  Islam	  for	  blasphemy	  
as	   well	   as	   for	   those	   who,	   like	   the	   late	   Salman	  
Taseer,	   oppose	   such	  punishment.	   Addressing	   the	  
issue	   from	   within	   an	   Islamic	   paradigm,	   with	   the	  
help	  of	  copious	  quotes	  from	  the	  Quran	  and	  Hadith,	  
Khan’s	  case	  against	  death	  for	  blasphemers	  would,	  
one	  supposes,	  appear	  more	  convincing	  to	  Muslims	  
than	   secular	   human	   rights	   arguments	   against	  
Pakistan’s	   deadly	   anti-­‐blasphemy	   law	   that	   has	  
unleashed	  such	  havoc	  in	  that	  country.
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Like	  most	  Muslims,	  Khan	  believes	  that	  Islam	  is	  the	  
only	   true	   religion.	   Muslims,	   he	   says,	   are	  
commanded	  by	  God	  to	   communicate	  Islam	  to	   the	  
rest	   of	   humanity.	   This	   work	   of	   dawah	   or	  
‘invitation’	  to	  the	  faith	  is,	  he	  says,	   the	  hallmark	  of	  a	  
true	  Muslim.	  Yet,	  he	  laments,	  ‘the	  Muslims	  of	  today	  
are	   totally	   bereft	   of	   dawah	   consciousness’.	   This	  
lack,	   he	   contends,	   is	   at	   the	   very	   root	   of	   the	  
manifold	   conNlicts	   that	   Muslims	   are	   presently	  
embroiled	   in	   with	   others	   in	   large	   parts	   of	   the	  
world.	   This	   almost	   total	   absence	   of	   ‘dawah	  
consciousness’	   has	   made	  Muslims,	   so	   he	   argues,	  
victims	  of	  a	  peculiar	  superiority	  complex	  (that	  has	  
no	  warrant	  in	  Islam)	  that	  drives	  them	  on	  to	  engage	  
in	  endless	  conNlict	  with	  others.	  Muslims,	  he	  writes,	  
imagine	   themselves	   as	   ‘the	   soldiers	   of	   God,	   the	  
censors	  of	  the	  morals	  of	  the	  whole	  of	  creation,	  and	  
the	  deputies	   of	  God	  on	  earth’,	  which,	   he	  contends,	  
is	  ‘absurdly	  un-­‐Islamic’.	  He	  insists	  that	  this	  attitude	  
of	   presumed	   superiority	   and	   the	   drive	   for	  
confronting	   and	   dominating	   others	   that	   it	  
instigates	   have	   absolutely	   no	   sanction	   in	   the	  
Quran.	   He	   quotes	   the	   Quran	   as	   referring	   to	   the	  
Prophet	  as	  simply	  as	  a	  warner	  and	  guide,	  and	  not	  
as	  a	  ruler	  over	  the	  people	  he	  addressed,	   and	  rues	  
that	  Muslims	  behave	   in	  a	  totally	   contrary	  manner	  
in	  their	  relations	  with	  non-­‐Muslims.	  ‘They	  want	  to	  
rule	  over	  others’,	   Khan	  laments.	  And	  that,	  he	  adds,	  
is	  ‘their	  biggest	  psychological	  problem.’
The	   Quran,	   Khan	   says,	   exhorts	   Muslims	   to	   be	  
bearers	  of	  glad	  tidings	  to	  others	  and	  to	  invite	  them	  
to	  God’s	   path.	  The	  work	   of	  dawah	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  
verbal	  calling.	  Rather,	   for	  dawah	  to	  be	  effective,	  he	  
says,	   Muslims	   must	   themselves	   be	   righteous,	  
including	   in	   their	   dealings	   with	   people	   of	   other	  
faiths.	   They	   must	   see	   themselves	   as	   dais	   or	  
missionaries	   inviting	   others	   to	   God’s	   path,	   and	  
regard	  others	  as	  madus	  or	  addressees	  of	  the	  divine	  
invitation.	  Dawah,	  Khan	  says,	   ‘must	  form	  the	  basis	  
of	   the	   believer’s	   personality	   and	  must	   shape	   his	  
relations	   with	   others.’	   These	   relations	   must	   be	  
fundamentally	   shaped	   by	   the	   dawah	   imperative,	  
which	   means	   that	   Muslims	   must	   always	   seek	   to	  
relate	  kindly	   and	   compassionately	   with	   others.	   A	  
true	  dai,	   committed	  to	   this	   principal	   Islamic	   duty	  
of	   dawah,	   must	   relate	   to	   people	   of	   other	  
communities	   with	   love	   and	   concern	   for	   their	  
welfare.	   They	   should	   ‘keep	   the	   needs	   of	   dawah	  
above	   all	   other	   considerations,’	   Khan	   says.	   They	  
might	   face	   all	   sorts	   of	   loss	   and	   damage	   at	   the	  
hands	  of	  others,	   but	   at	   no	   cost	   should	  they	  allow	  
the	  cause	  of	   dawah	  to	   be	   hampered.	   This	   means,	  
Khan	   insists,	   that	   ‘they	   must	   not	   resort	   to	   such	  
activities	   that	   are	   opposed	   to	   the	   demands	   of	  
dawah	   or	   that	   undermine	   its	   prospects.’	  
Principally,	   they	   must	   desist	   from	   conNlicts	   with	  
people	   of	   other	   faiths,	   even	   in	   the	   face	   of	   grave	  
provocation,	   for	   this	   would	   certainly	   further	  
reinforce	   their	   prejudices	   against	   Islam	   and	  
Muslims	   and	  only	   sabotage	   prospects	   for	   dawah.	  
Even	  when	  confronted	  with	  extremely	  hurtful	  and	  
provocative	   situations,	   such	   as	   blasphemy,	   they	  
must	   not	   resort	   to	   violent	   agitation	   and	  demand	  
the	  death	   of	  the	   culprit.	   There	   are	   other,	   rational	  
and	  more	   meaningful,	   ways	   to	   react,	   Khan	   says,	  
but	   to	   react	   violently	   and	   to	   call	   for	   the	   death	  of	  
blasphemers	   would	   only	   further	   magnify	   anti-­‐
Muslim	   and	   anti-­‐Islamic	   sentiments,	   harden	  
borders	   between	   Muslims	   and	   others,	   and,	  
thereby,	   place	   additional	   barriers	   in	   the	   path	   of	  
dawah.
Khan	  is	  convinced	  that	  the	  Muslims	  of	  today	  have	  
abandoned	  their	  divine	  duty	  of	  dawah.	  This	  is	  why,	  
he	  writes,	   instead	  of	  seeking	  to	   relate	  kindly	  with	  
people	   of	   other	   faiths,	   as	   addressees	   of	   the	  
‘invitation’	   to	   God’s	   path,	   they	   consider	   the	   latter	  
as	   their	   ‘communal	   enemies’	   and	   are	   constantly	  
engaged	  in	  seeking	  to	   confront	   them.	  Muslims,	   he	  
contends,	   wrongly	   imagine	   that	   they	   are	   ‘God’s	  
deputies	   on	   earth’,	   completely	   forgetting	   that	   the	  
Quran	   speaks	   about	   true	   believers	   as	   being	   His	  
witnesses	   to	   humanity.	   Because	   the	   drive	   for	  
dawah	  no	  longer	  enthuses	  them,	  he	  goes	  on,	  their
relations	   with	  people	  of	   other	   faiths	   are	   conNlict-­‐
ridden	   and	   they	   ‘engage	   in	   such	   acts	   as	   have	   no	  
sanction	  at	  all	  in	  Islam’.	  Their	  hatred	  for	  others,
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which	   promotes	   constant	   conNlict	   with	   them,	   h	   e	  
says,	  ‘is	  tantamount	  to	  murder	  of	  dawah.’	  	  Treating	  
others	   as	   their	   ‘political	   foes’,	   instead	   of	   as	  
‘potential	   addressees	  of	  God’s	   message’,	   they	   lose	  
no	   opportunity	   to	   drum	   up	   opposition	   and	  
instigate	   conNlicts	   and	   agitations	   directed	   against	  
them.	   Such	   Muslims,	   Khan	   minces	   no	   words	   in	  
saying,	   ‘are	   murderers	   of	   dawah	   and	   divine	  
guidance’.	  They	  are	  completely	  unmindful,	  he	  says,	  
that	   ‘by	   engaging	   in	   such	   activities	   that	   sabotage	  
dawah,	   they	   are	   inviting	   God’s	   wrath	   on	  
themselves.’	  
Khan	  then	  turns	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  blasphemy	  and	  the	  
violent	   agitations	   unleashed	   across	   the	   globe	   in	  
the	  wake	  of	  Khomeini’s	  fatwa	  calling	  for	  Rushdie’s	  
death.	   He	   insists	   that	   the	   fatwa	  and	  the	   agitation	  
that	   it	   stirred	   are	   tantamount	   to	   ‘murdering	  
dawah’,	  and	  bemoans	  that	  ‘it	  reNlects	  a	  total	  lack	  of	  
dawah	   consciousness.’	   Such	   reactions,	   he	   warns,	  
will	   only	   further	   reinforce	  deeply-­‐rooted	  negative	  
feelings	   among	   non-­‐Muslims	   about	   Islam	   and	  
Muslims,	   which	   would	   make	   the	   task	   of	   dawah	  
even	  more	  difNicult	   than	   it	   already	   is.	   He	   goes	   so	  
far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  those	  engaged	  in	  this	  agitation,	  
whether	   as	   leaders	   or	   foot-­‐soldiers,	   run	   the	   very	  
real	  risk	  of	  ‘being	  treated	  as	  criminals	   in	  the	  eyes	  
of	   God,	   notwithstanding	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   may	  
label	   their	   dawah-­‐murdering	   agitation	   as	   an	  
agitation	  for	   the	  glory	   of	  Islam.’	  Hence,	   he	  insists,	  
the	  fatwa	  and	  the	  violent	  agitation	  that	   it	  spurred	  
are	  ‘absurd	  and	  un-­‐Islamic’.	  Khan	  blames	  what	  he	  
sees	   as	   the	   Muslims’	   total	   lack	   of	   dawah	  
consciousness	   for	  what	   he	  perceives	  as	  their	  wild	  
emotionalism	   in	   the	   face	   of	   even	   the	   smallest	  
provocation.	   If	   anyone	   dares	   says	   anything,	   no	  
matter	   how	   minor,	   against	   their	  way	   of	   thinking,	  
he	   contends,	   they	   immediately	   get	   provoked	   and	  
resort	   to	   agitation	   and	   even	   violence.	   The	   most	  
sensitive	   issue	   in	   this	   regard,	   Khan	   notes,	   is	   the	  
image	   of	   the	  Prophet	  Muhammad.	   If	  anyone	   says	  
or	  writes	  anything	  about	  the	  Prophet	  that	  does	  not	  
correspond	   with	   how	   they	   themselves	   perceive	  
him,	   Khan	   notes,	   Muslims	   turn	   ‘uncontrollably	  
emotional’	  and	  ‘lose	  all	   reason.’	  Khan	  believes	  this	  
is	   not	   at	   all	   the	   appropriate	   Islamic	   attitude,	   and	  
traces	   it	   to	   what	   he	   perceives	   as	   the	   fact	   that	  
‘Muslims	  have	  abandoned	  dawah’.	  Because	  of	  this,	  
he	   explains,	   they	   now	   ‘see	   others	   as	   their	  
communal	   enemies’	   and	   consider	   any	   such	  
criticism	   as	   ‘an	   attack	   on	   their	   communal	   pride’,	  
which	   forces	   them	   out	   on	   the	   streets	   in	   violent	  
agitation	  and	  worse.
Had	   Mus l ims	   ma in ta ined	   the i r	   ‘ dawah	  
consciousness’,	   he	   remarks,	   they	   would	   have	  
responded	  to	  the	  provocation	  differently:	   through	  
patience	  and	  avoidance	  of	  conNlict,	   as	  he	   says	   the	  
Quran	   advises	   them	   to,	   so	   that	   prospects	   for	  
dawah	  would	  not	   thereby	   be	   damaged.	   But	   since	  
they	   have	   lost	   the	   commitment	   to	   dawah,	   he	  
laments,	   they	  have	  fallen	  victim	  to	  what	  he	   terms	  
‘false	   emotionalism’	   that	   drives	   them	   to	   respond	  
violently	   to	   any	   and	   every	   provocation.	   This	  
stance,	   he	   says,	   is	   completely	   un-­‐Quranic,	   and	   is	  
bound	   to	   reinforce	   anti-­‐Islamic	   prejudices	   that	  
underlie	  phenomenon	  such	  as	   blasphemy,	   instead	  
of	  doing	  anything	  at	  all	  to	  resolve	  them.
In	   the	   face	   of	   provocations,	   such	   as	   negative	  
statements	  or	  writings	  against	  Islam,	  Khan	  advises	  
Muslims	   not	   to	   give	   in	   to	   the	   temptation	  to	   react	  
with	   violent	   agitation.	   Instead,	   he	   advises,	   they	  
should	   respond	   ‘with	   patience,	   wisdom,	   far-­‐
sightedness	   and	   clear-­‐mindedness’,	   these	   being	  
qualities	  which	  he	   identiNies	  with	   ‘success	   in	  this	  
world	  and	  in	  the	  next’.
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If	   one	   were	   to	   specify	   the	   top	  
some	  issues	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  in	  
the	   21st	   century,	   brought	   up	   in	  
political	   and	   academic	   domains,	  
the	   Afghanistan	   issue	   after	   the	  
Ta l iban	   debac le	   would	   be	  
p e r t i n e n t	   a m o n g	   t h e m .	  
Afghanistan	   sheds	   some	   crucial	  
l i g h t	   f o r	   t h e	   c o n d u c t	   o f	  
international	   missions	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
fragile	   states	   since	   fall	   of	   2001.	  
Among	  the	  members	  of	  NATO	  and	  
discussions	   hovering	   over	   the	  
question	  of	  objective,	   tactics	   and	  
strategies	   for	   Afghanistan's	  
mission,	   Canada	   and	   Germany	  
express	   qu i te	   a symmetr i c	  
viewpoints.	   This	   volume	   of	   the	  
essays	  by	  leading	  the	  German	  and	  
Canadian	   assessment	   presents	   intra-­‐alliance	  
debates	   over	   government,	   economy	   and	   security	  
dynamics	   in	   Afghanistan	   and	   suggests	   better	  
approaches	   to	   the	   policy	   questions	   encountered	  
within	  NATO.	   In	  doing	  so,	   Ehrhart's	   (et	  al.)	  edited	  
volume	   also	   focuses	   more	   narrowly	   on	   the	  
German-­‐Canadian	   dialogue.	   Conceptually,	   in	  
addition	   to	   the	   introduction	   accentuating	   the	  
Canadian-­‐German	   narrative,	   this	   volume	   consists	  
of	  two	  parts	  and	  Nifteen	  chapters.	  The	  Nirst	  section	  
of	   the	   book	   examines	   the	   diverse	   facets	   of	  
international	   missions	   in	   Afghanistan	   ranging	  
from	   the	   political	   and	   institutional	   framework	   at	  
the	   international	   level	   of	   the	   security	   dynamics;	  
the	   policies	   of	   the	   main	   neighboring	   states,	   and	  
governance	  and	  development.	   In	  the	  Nirst	  Chapter,	  
Citha	   Maass,	   Conrad	   Schetterand	   &	   Rainer	  
Glassner	  and	  Florian	  Kühn	  address	  in	  more	  detail	  
the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Compact	   and	   its	  
predecessor,	   Bonn	   Agreement	   and	   their	   features,	  
the	  limits	   of	  the	  term	  often	  used	  in	  this	  context,	   -­‐	  
warlordism[1]	   -­‐	  as	  a	  depiction	  of	  the	  structures	  of	  
violence	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  the	  political	  economy	  
–	  the	  long	  history	  of	  Afghanistan	  as	  a	  rentier	  state.	  
The	  volume	  then	  continues	  with	  a	  
s e r i e s	   o f	   c h ap t e r s	   wh i c h	  
concentrate	   more	   speciNically	   on	  
the	   role	   of	   non-­‐governmental	  
organizations	   (NGOs),	   and	   Iran	  
and	  Pakistan	  in	  Afghanistan.	   Lara	  
Olson	  and	  Andrea	   Charran	   study	  
the	   efforts	   of	   NGOs	   to	   inNluence	  
the	  wider	   international	  strategies	  
for	   security,	   development	   and	  
peace	   in	   Afghanistan.	   Christin	  
Wagner	  offers	  an	  analysis	  on	  how	  
the	  Pakistani	  army's	  costly	  battles	  
in	  the	  tribal	  areas	  and	  the	  shift	  of	  
Pakistani	   foreign	   policy	   towards	  
I nd i a	   a f f e c t	   t h e	   b i l a t e ra l	  
r e l a t i o n s h i p	   w i t h	   K a b u l .	  
Meanwh i l e ,	   J a n e t	   Ku r s aw	  
evaluates	   Tehran's	   policy	   to	  
Afghanistan.	   On	   the	   one	   hand,	  
Iran	  is	   staging	  friendly	   relations	  with	  Afghanistan	  
and	   supporting	   the	   current	   Afghan	   government.	  
On	   the	   other	   hand,	   Iran	   remains	   suspicious	   of	  
supporting	   the	   political	   opponents	   of	   the	   Afghan	  
government	  (p.	  138).	  To	  close	  out	  the	  Nirst	  section,	  
Ehrhart	   and	   Kaestner	   provide	   a	   strategic	  
assessment	   of	   the	   international	   assessment	   in	  
Afghanistan	   in	   terms	   of	   security,	   governance	   and	  
development.
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The	   second	   part	   of	   the	   volume	   lays	   out	   the	  
asymmetric	   dialogues	   in	   Canadian	   and	   German	  
approaches	   as	   they	   act	   in	   domestic	   politics,	  
alliance	   diplomacy	   and	   the	   critical	   issues	   of	  
security	   sector	   reform	   to	   Afghanistan	   mission.	  
While	   the	  writers	  with	  Canadian	  viewpoints	   such	  
as	  Kim	  Richard	  Nossal,	  M.D	  Capstick	  and	  David	  M.	  
Law	   accentuate	   the	   military	   contribution	   to	   the	  
international	   coalition	  working	   to	   ensure	   Afghan	  
security	   and	  developments,	  Michael	   Brzoska	  with	  
a	   German	   outlook	   supports	   the	   ongoing	   police	  
reform[2]	   in	  Afghanistan.	  Although	  to	  what	  extent	  
that	   approach	   could	   be	   successful	   in	   the	   very	  
demanding	   context	   of	   Afghanistan	   remains	   a	  
matter	   of	   debate.	   Proceeding	   from	   the	   German-­‐
Canadian	   mission	   in	   Afghanistan,	   they	   emerge	  
ofNicially	   multi-­‐dimensional	   and	   integrated	   focus	  
on	   security,	   governance	   and	   development.	  
Collectively,	   the	   chapters	   of	   the	   book	   provide	   an	  
account	   of	   the	   overall	   security	   problems	   and	  
security	   reforms	   in	   that	   country.	   However,	   the	  
difNiculty	  for	  the	  reader	  is	   to	  avoid	  the	  conclusion	  
that	   the	   German-­‐Canadian	   dialogue	   only	   has	  
extremely	   limited	  prospects.	   Concomitantly,	   there	  
is	   a	   big	   question	   underlying	   the	   dialogues	   on	   to	  
what	   extent	   approaches	   to	   security	   reform	   with	  
respect	  to	  government	  and	  development	  recast	  the	  
practical	  framework	  in	  Afghanistan	  without	  taking	  
into	   account	   the	   socio-­‐cultural	   context.	   Although	  
the	   difNiculty	   of	   editing	   and	   constructing	   a	   study	  
composed	  of	  a	  series	  of	  contributions	  by	  different	  
authors	   is	   appreciated,	   this	   book	   beneNits	   from	  
coherence	   and	   from	   the	   use	   of	   primary	   data.	   As	  
the	   book	  must	   be	   judged	   successful	   in	   providing	  
basic	   information	   about	   security	   issues	   in	  
Afghanistan,	   however,	   that	   import	  must	   be	   beset	  
by	  some	  shortcomings.	  
First,	   although	   the	   pivot	   of	   examination	   has	  
focused	   on	   security,	   a	   precise	   theory	   of	  
international	   security	   is	   not	   in	   evidence	   in	   the	  
book.	   Recalling	   the	  Copenhagen	  School	   theory	   of	  
security	   studies,	   Afghanistan	   emerges	   as	   an	  
insulator	   state	   between	   the	   sub-­‐complex	   of	   the	  
Persian	  Gulf	  and	  Southeast	  Asia.	   After	   the	  Taliban	  
debacle,	   the	  US	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  the	  superpower	  and	  
the	  great	  power	  are	  associated	  with	  the	  problems	  
of	   Afghanistan	   in	   a	   way	   never	   seen	   before.	  
Concomitantly,	   Afghanistan's	   neighboring	   states	  
affect	  the	  internal	  security	  dynamic	  in	  that	  country	  
too.	   In	  this	  regard,	   the	  Regional	   Security	  Complex	  
Theory,	  to	  name	  just	  one	  example,	  could	  have	  been	  
adopted	   as	   the	   guiding	   theory	   in	   the	   volume.	  
Following	   the	   lack	  of	  powerful	   government	  and	  a	  
local	  economy	  with	  a	   reliance	  on	  drugs	   trade,	   the	  
political	   and	   economic	   sectors	   of	   security	   as	  
proposed	  within	   the	  CS	   theory	  would	  fulNill	   these	  
needs.
Second,	   since	   the	   Nirst	   section	   of	   the	   volume	  
assesses	   the	  causes	  of	  security	   in	  Afghanistan,	   for	  
example	   the	  process	   tracing	  method	  would	   serve	  
in	   that	   capacity,	   while	   the	   second	   part	   which	  
accentuates	   the	   German-­‐Canadian	   dialogue	   in	  
Afghanistan	   could	   beneNit	   from	   the	   narrative	  
analysis	  method	  due	  to	   the	  key	  role	  that	   language	  
plays	  in	  constructing	  actors'	  distinct	  realities.	  
Although	   other	   solutions	   that	   the	   ones	   now	  
adopted	   could	   have	   been	   part	   of	   the	   book,	   in	  
summary,	   the	   book	   shows	   impressive,	   thoughtful	  
and	   academically	   innovative	   analysis	   that	  
articulates	   well	   onto	   the	   pertinent	   issues	   in	  
Afghanistan	   while	   casting	  more	   light	   on	   security	  
reforms	   should	  be	   considered.	   It	   might	   not	  be	  all	  
security	   problems,	   however,	   that	   becomes	   an	  
important	   contribution	   to	   the	   discussion	   on	   the	  
security	   studies,	   and	   the	  Middle	  East	   that	   should	  
interest	  for	  the	  Middle	  East	  scholars.
[1]	   Warlordism	   in	   the	   recent	   literature	   of	  
Afghanistan	  signiNies	  "lack	  of	  security".	  (p.39)
[2]	   The	   German	   approach	   to	   police	   reform	   in	  
Afghanistan	  –	  and	  justiNication	  for	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  
program	   –	   emphasizes	   quality	   training	   of	   civilian	  
police.	   Quality	   was	   to	   trickle	   down	   from	   the	   top	  
echelons	   and	   the	   beset	   trained	   personnel	   to	   the	  
ordinary	  police	  ofNicer	  (p.	  284).	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A	   Book	   Review:	   Nader	   Hashemi’s	   Islam,	  
Secularism	  &	  Liberal	  Democracy	  
Sheena	  Sharma	  -­	  sheenapsharma@gmail.com	  
Reviewed	  Nader	  Hashemi,	   Islam,	   Secularism,	   and	  
Liberal	   Democracy:	   Toward	   a	   Democratic	   Theory	  
for	   Muslim	   Societies,	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  
2009,	  304	  pp,	  ISBN13:	  9780195321241
Nader	  Hashemi’s	   work	   entitled	   Islam,	   Secularism	  
and	   Liberal	   Democracy	   examines	   the	   intricate	  
relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  democracy	  and	  
attempts	   to	   demonstrate	   the	   possibility	   for	   a	  
liberal	   democratic	   theory	   for	   Muslim	   societies.	  
Hashemi	   argues	   that	   because	   religion	   is	   such	   a	  
signiNicant	   identity	   marker	   in	   the	   Middle	   East,	  
secularism	  is	  possible	  if	  
a n d	   o n l y	   i f	   i t	   i s	  
inclusive	   of	   Islam.	   In	  
h i s	   i n t r o d u c t i o n ,	  
Hashemi	  states	  that	  the	  
aim	   of	   his	   work	   is	   to	  
c on t r i bu t e	   t o	   t h e	  
“development	   of	   a	  
l i be ra l -­‐democra t i c	  
theory	   for	   Musl im	  
s o c i e t i e s	   i n	  
particular.”	   (1)	   His	  
work	   d isputes	   the	  
claim	   that	   Islam	   and	  
secularism	  are	  incompatible	  and	  he	  provides	  three	  
central	  arguments	  for	  furthering	  this	  claim:
1. “Liberal	   democracy	   requires	   secularism…
First,	   religious	  traditions	  are	  not	  born	  with	  
an	   inherent	   democratic	   and	   secular	  
conception	  of	  politics.	   These	  ideas	  must	  be	  
socially	  constructed…
2. In	   societies	   where	   religion	   is	   a	   marker	   of	  
identity,	   the	   road	   to	   liberal	   democracy,	  
whatever	   other	   twists	   and	   turns	   it	  makes,	  
cannot	   avoid	  passing	   through	   the	   gates	   of	  
religious	   politics…the	   development	   of	  
liberal	  democracy	   in	  the	  West	  emerged	  not	  
in	  strict	  opposition	  to	   religious	  politics	  but	  
often	  in	  concert	  with	  it…
3. An	   intimate	  and	  often-­‐ignored	  relationship	  
exists	   between	   religious	   reformation	   and	  
political	   development.	   The	   Nirst	   typically	  
precedes	   the	   second,	   although	   the	  
processes	   are	   deeply	   interwoven	   and	  
connected.”	  (2)
Although	   these	   three	   central	   premises	   appeared	  
very	   abstract	   upon	   my	   initial	   reading	   of	   them,	   I	  
Nind	   that	   Hashemi	   did	   an	   exceptional	   job	   at	  
connecting	   his	   work	   as	   a	   whole	   to	   these	   main	  
arguments.	   Hashemi’s	   introduction	   then	  
commences	   to	   discuss	   Islamic	   fundamentalism	   in	  
recent	   years,	   and	   how	   such	   movements	   give	   the	  
general	   attitude	   that	   Islam	   is	   inherently	  
incompatible	   with	   modernity.	   The	   rise	   and	  
p o p u l a r i t y	   o f	   I s l a m i c	  
fundamentalism	  would	   appear	  
to	   be	   a	   difNicult	   obstacle	   for	  
Hashemi	   to	   overcome	   when	  
discussing	   the	   possibility	   for	  
liberal	   democracy	   in	   Muslim	  
soc i e t i e s	   –	   however,	   he	  
immediately	   turns	   the	  reader’s	  
attention	   to	   examples	   of	  
Christianity’s	   struggles	   with	  
the	   relationship	   between	  
religion	   and	   democracy.	   This	  
focus	   on	   Christianity	   and	   the	  
West’s	  struggle	  with	  secularism	  
and	   modernity	   becomes	   a	   central	   focus	   of	  
Hashemi’s	  writing.	   He	  argues	   that	  while	  there	  are	  
clearly	  numerous	  noteworthy	  differences	  between	  
the	   two	   religious	   traditions,	   he	   strongly	   believes	  
that	   the	   West’s	   experience	   can	   serve	   as	   a	   useful	  
framework	   for	   understanding	   the	   recent	   (and	  
future)	   developments	   in	   Muslim	   majority	  
societies.	  Hashemi	  asserts	  that	  this	  cross-­‐historical	  
and	   cross-­‐cultural	   examination	   is	   vital	   for	  
understanding	  whether	  and	  how	  Muslim	  societies	  
can	   form	   a	   democratic	   and	   secular	   government	  
that	   is	   “compatible	   with	   their	   own	   historical,	  
cultural	  and	  religious	  traditions.”	  (7)	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Central	   for	   a	   lucid	   understanding	   of	   Hashemi’s	  
arguments	   is	   a	   clear	   deNinition	   of	   liberal	  
democracy;	   while	   his	   deNinition	   in	   this	   particular	  
work	   is	   inNluenced	  by	   the	  writings	   of	   John	  Locke,	  
Jean	  Jacque	  Rousseau	  and	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  his	  key	  
components	  to	  liberal	  democracy	  include	  “political	  
authority	   [which	   is]	   rooted	   in	   the	   consent	   of	   the	  
governed,	   the	   people	   rule	   via	   their	   elected	  
representatives,	   and	   basic	   human	   rights.”	   (7)	  
Additionally,	   as	   described	   by	   Robert	   Dahl,	   there	  
must	  exist	   certain	  institutional	   and	  constitutional	  
guarantees.	   Here	  Hashemi	   also	   takes	   the	   time	   to	  
note	   that	   modernization	   does	   not	   mean	  
Westernization,	  as	  the	  “West	  was	  West	  long	  before	  
it	   was	   modern.”	   (8)	   I	   do	   appreciate	   Hashemi	  
keeping	  this	  point	  as	  simple	  and	  succinct	  as	  he	  did	  
–	  any	  additional	   information	  or	  reference	  to	  other	  
scholars	   would	   have	   been	   an	   unnecessary	  
distraction	  for	  the	  reader.	  
Hashemi’s	  introduction	  then	  progresses	  to	  discuss	  
the	   most	   inherent	   and	   obvious	   ‘tensions’	   which	  
exist	  between	   religion	  and	  democracy	   (given	  that	  
Hashemi	  seeks	  to	  establish	  a	  positive	   relationship	  
between	  religion	  and	  democracy,	   his	   critics	  would	  
be	  sure	  to	  point	  out	  any	  such	  tensions	  which	  exist	  
between	   the	  two	   if	  Hashemi	  hadn’t	   done	  so).	   The	  
most	   important	   point	   the	   author	   makes	   here	   is	  
that	  “unlike	  religious	   commandments,	  the	  rules	  of	  
democracy	   can	   be	   changed,	   adjusted,	   and	  
amended.”	  (9)	  He	  furthers	  this	  point	  by	  noting	  that	  
while	   religion	   creates	   a	   vertical	   relationship	  
between	   man	   and	   God,	   democracy	   creates	   a	  
horizontal	  relationship	  between	  man	  and	  man.	  
Given	   that	   this	   is	   his	   introduction,	   one	   shouldn’t	  
expect	  everything	  that	  is	  brought	  up	  in	  this	  section	  
to	  be	  brought	  up	  again	  in	  later	  chapters.	  However,	  
if	  an	  author	  introduces	  something	  like	  the	  diagram	  
above	   in	  their	   introduction,	   one	  might	  expect	   the	  
author	  to	   reference	  said	  diagram	  in	  other	  parts	  of	  
their	  work.	  Given	  that	  this	  Nigure	  is	  the	  only	  Nigure	  
utilized	   in	   the	   entire	   177	   pages,	   it	   might	   be	  
assumed	   that	   it	   is	   of	   importance	   to	   the	   author’s	  
main	   argument.	   However,	   this	   Nigure	   was	   not	   re-­‐
introduced	   nor	   referenced	   in	   any	   of	   his	   four	  
chapters.	  This	  diagram	  doesn’t	  appear	  to	  serve	  any	  
critical	   purpose,	   even	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	  
present	   discussion	   on	   the	   tensions	   that	   exist	  
between	   religion	   and	   democracy.	   It	   would	   have	  
been	  sufNicient	  for	  Hashemi	  to	  progress	  to	  his	  next	  
two	  comments	  on	  religion	  and	  democracy.2	  
Hashemi’s	   introduction	   then	   reiterates	   the	   three	  
main	   argument	   points	   mentioned	   in	   the	   very	  
beginning	   of	   this	   section.	   This	   does	   seem	   very	  
redundant	   and	   unnecessary,	   though	   there	   are	   a	  
couple	   of	   fresh	   points	   that	   he	   introduces	   in	   this	  
second	   discussion	   of	   his	   arguments.	   Firstly,	   he	  
notes	  that	  he	  believes	   there	  is	  more	  than	  one	  type	  
of	   secularism,	   thus	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   Muslim	  
societies	  to	  create	  their	  own	  version	  (as	  Christians	  
did)	  while	  respecting	  their	  historical,	  religious	  and	  
cultural	   backgrounds.	   He	   also	   reiterates	   the	   link	  
between	   “changing	   religious	   ideas”	   and	   the	  
“development	  of	  liberal	  democracy”	  in	  the	  West	  as	  
important	   for	   Muslim	   societies	   to	   replicate	   in	  
order	  to	  achieve	  liberal	  democracy.	  	  	  
I	  believe	  that	  it	  would	  have	  been	  sufNicient	  for	  the	  
author	   to	   conclude	   his	   introduction	   after	   these	  
points,	   however	   he	   goes	   on	   to	   outline	   the	   main	  
purposes	   of	   each	   chapter,	   while	   also	   discussing	  
methodology	  and	  theoretical	  assumptions	  (though	  
I	  appreciate	  him	  not	   overloading	  his	  readers	  with	  
a	   lengthy	   explanation	   of	   his	   methodology	   and	  
approach).	  
Toward	   a	   Democratic	   Theory	   of	   Muslim	  
Societies:	  The	  Historical	  Background
The	   Nirst	   of	  Hashemi’s	   four	   chapters	   immediately	  
begins	   by	   attempting	   to	   deNine	   modernity	   by	  
looking	   at	   a	   number	   of	   different	   scholars	   and	  
theories,	   the	   most	   germane	   being	   Alfred	   Stepan	  
whom	  Hashemi	  references	  throughout	  his	  work.	   It	  
is	  also	  within	  this	  context	  that	  Hashemi	  references	  
Samuel	  Huntington’s	  important	  1984	  essay	  “Will
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More	   Countries	   Become	   Democratic,”	   where	  
Huntington	   argues	   that	   the	   rise	   of	   Islamic	  
fundamentalism	   essentially	   precludes	   any	  
possibility	   for	   democracy	   in	   the	   region.	   Hashemi	  
counters	   this	   argument	   by	   stating	   that	  
Huntington’s	  “view	  is	  only	  valid	  from	  a	  short-­‐term	  
perspective…[and]	   if	   one	   takes	   a	   longer	   view	   of	  
history,	   the	  emergence	  of	   Islamic	   fundamentalism	  
and	   its	   contributions	   to	   democratization	   can	   be	  
interpreted	   differently.”	   (30)	   Essentially	   what	  
Hashemi	   argues	   is	   that	   the	   s igni N icant	  
transformations	  a	  traditional	  society	  undergoes	  to	  
become	   modern	   causes	   much	   tension	   and	  
uncertainty	   among	   the	   people	   of	   said	   society,	  
resulting	  in	  the	  rise	  of	  fundamentalist	  movements	  
which	  are	  able	  to	  provide	  some	  sense	  of	  certainty.	  
Turning	   to	   the	   more	   contemporary	   obstacles	  
facing	   Muslim	   societies	   today,	   Hashemi	   asserts	  
that	   we	   must	   look	   at	   the	   social	   conditions	   that	  
have	   allowed	   for	   Islamic	   Fundamentalism	   to	  
emerge	   rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   the	   concepts	  
associated	  with	  this	  ideology.	  Yes,	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  
message	  of	  fundamentalism,	  one	  might	  be	  quick	  to	  
assume	   that	   Islam	   and	   secularism	   are	   not	  
compatible	  and	  will	   never	  truly	  be	  so	   (as	  Western	  
states	  have	  come	  to	  be).	  Yet	  Hashemi’s	  progressive	  
thinking	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  developing	  a	  
liberal	  democratic	  theory	   for	  Muslim	  societies.	  He	  
advances	   this	   argument	   by	   referencing	   major	  
occurrences	   in	   the	   West	   that	   parallel	   Islamic	  
fundamentalism.	   He	   argues	   that	   fundamentalist	  
movements	  will	  emerge	  in	  any	  society	  undergoing	  
transition	  to	  modernity	   and	  that	   this	   is	  especially	  
true	   for	   societies	   where	   religion	   is	   an	   important	  
marker	   of	   identity.	   “Radical	   religious	   protest	  
movements,	   such	   as	   Islamism,	   have	   a	   proto-­‐
modern	   character	   to	   them.	   Their	   impact	   and	  
relationship	   to	   the	   development	   of	   liberal	  
democracy	   can	  be	   better	   appreciated	   by	   focusing	  
on	   their	   sociological	   effects	   over	   the	   long	   term	  
rather	   then	   on	   their	   doctrinal	   content.”	   (24)	  
Similar	   to	   what	   Oliver	   Roy	   discusses	   in	   his	  work	  
Globalized	   Islam ,	   Hashemi	   observes	   that	  
fundamentalist	   groups	   offer	   a	   sense	   of	   stability	  
and	  certainty	   in	   an	   increasingly	   uncertain	  world,	  
however	   movements	   of	   this	   nature	   eventually	  
come	  to	  an	  end.	  
Reference	  to	   the	  European	  experience	  is	  a	  critical	  
component	   of	   this	   chapter.	   While	   Hashemi	  
believes	   that	   modernization	   was	   a	   ‘traumatic	  
process’	  for	  Western	  societies	  just	  as	  it	  has	  been	  in	  
Muslim	   majority	   societies,	   he	   notes	   that	   the	  
“process	   of	   social	   change	   and	   evolution	   was	  
organic	   to	   Europe”	  (27),	   a	  point	   that	  he	   develops	  
in	   later	   chapters.	   Hashemi	   states	   that	   radical	  
religious	   movements	   and	   their	   actors	   serve	   as	  
catalysts	   for	  modernization,	   a	   point	   that	   I	   do	   not	  
entirely	  agree	  with.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  large	  assumption	  
for	   Hashemi	   to	   make,	   one	   which	   he	   does	   not	  
appear	  to	   justify	  or	  explain	  with	  much	  clarity.	  Can	  
one	   truly	  believe	   that	  radical	   movements	   in	  parts	  
of	  the	  Middle	  East	  today	  are	  solely	  responsible	  for	  
aiding	   the	   process	   and	   development	   of	  
modernization	  in	  those	  countries?	  I	  think	  not.	  Yes,	  
these	   type	   of	   movements	   may	   result	   in	   more	  
Muslims	   wishing	   for	   some	   alternative	   (perhaps	  
some	  form	  of	  secularism?),	   but	  I	  do	  not	  agree	  that	  
fundamentalist	   groups	   are	   “catalysts	   for	  
modernization.”	  
	  
Hashemi’s	  short	  discussion	  on	  ‘what	  is	  modernity’	  
that	   follows	   however	   is	   sufNicient,	   succinct	   and	  
interesting.	   He	   generally	   states	   that	   unlike	   the	  
organic	   rise	   of	   modernity	   in	   the	   West ,	  
modernization	   was	   forced	   on	   non-­‐Western	  
societies	   by	   colonial	   forces.	   Thankfully,	   Hashemi	  
saves	   the	   elaborate	   discussion	   pertaining	   to	   this	  
topic	   for	   his	   last	   chapter,	   which	   I	   Nind	   to	   be	   very	  
Nitting	  and	  appropriate.	  His	  discussion	  in	  this	   Nirst	  
chapter	   is	   much	   simpler,	   with	   basic	   comparisons	  
between	   traditional	   and	   modern	   societies.	   For	  
instance,	   he	  notes	   that	   “traditional	   societies	  were	  
thought	   to	   be	   static	   and	   unchanging…seen	   as	  
circular,	   linear	   and	   progressive;	   creativity	   and	  
innovation	   were	   thought	   to	   be	   nonexistent;	   and,	  
critically,	   religion	   was	   viewed	   as	   a	   signiNicant	  
barrier	  to	  progress.”	  (29)	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It	  is	  also	  in	  this	  chapter	  that	  Hashemi	  develops	  his	  
comparison	   of	   Christianity	   (or,	   more	   speciNically,	  
Christian	  societies	  undergoing	   social	   and	  political	  
transformations)	   with	   Islam.	   He	   is	   very	   upfront	  
about	   his	   methodology	   and	   that	   “comparing	  
contemporary	   Iran	   and	   seventeenth-­‐century	  
England	  is	  problematic.”	  (32)	  For	  this	  comparison,	  
he	  speciNically	   focuses	  on	  Islamic	   fundamentalism	  
and	   radical	   Protestantism.	   To	   help	   his	   approach,	  
he	   references	   Fred	   Dallmayr,	   who	   employs	   a	  
similar	   “crosscivilizational”	   methodology	   in	   his	  
own	  work.	   The	  main	  argument	   of	   this	   chapter	   is	  
that	   secularism	   did	   not	   come	   about	   easily	   in	   the	  
West,	   so	   one	   should	   not	   expect	   it	   to	   develop	  
smoothly	   and	  without	   any	  major	   setbacks	   in	   the	  
Middle	   East.	   Looking	   at	   contemporary	   Iran,	  
Hashemi	   states	   that	   even	   their	   religion	   has	  
“become	   politicized,	   in	   large	   part	   due	   to	   the	  
destabilizing	   effects	   of	   rapid	  modernization	  on	  a	  
traditional	   society	   and	   also	   as	   a	   reaction	   to	   the	  
authoritarian	   policies	   of	   the	   state.”	   (65)	   While	  
Hashemi	   believes	   that	   political	   Islam	   has	   had	  
modernizing	  effects	  on	  society,	  I	  would	  argue	  that	  
the	   reverse	   is	   true:	   the	   advent	   of	  modernization	  
(or,	   at	   least,	   some	   features	  of	   it)	  have	  allowed	  for	  
the	   emergence	   of	   political	   actors	   in	   the	   public	  
sphere.	  The	  phenomenon	  as	  described	  by	  Hashemi	  
may	   be	   indicative	   of	   the	   transformations	   taking	  
place	  within	   society,	   but	   I	   strongly	   disagree	   with	  
his	   belief	   that	   the	   actors	   are	   the	   one’s	   directly	  
creating	   the	  change;	   rather,	   I	   feel	   that	   the	  change	  
has	  allowed	  for	  such	  actors	  to	  emerge.	  
Dueling	   Scriptures:	   The	   Political	   Theology	   of	  
John	   Locke	   and	   the	   Democratization	   of	  
Muslims	  Societies	  
Perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  most	  important	  points	  raised	  in	  
Hashemi’s	  second	  chapter	  is	  his	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  
a	   proper	   sequence	   that	   must	   be	   followed	   for	   the	  
development	   of	   secularism	   in	   any	   society.	  
Referencing	   Abdou	   Filali-­‐Ansary,	   Hashemi	   states	  
that	   “the	   fact	   that	   a	   religious	   reformation	   in	  
Europe	   preceded	   and	   then	   led	   to	   secularization	  
seems	   to	   suggest	   something	   important	   about	   the	  
sequence	   and	   process	   of	   liberal-­‐democratic	  
development.”	  (69)	  Filali-­‐Ansary	  has	  observed	  that	  
there	   has	   been	   a	   “reversal	   of	   the	   European	  
experience	   in	   the	   Muslim	   world,”	   (70)	   meaning	  
that	   secularization	   and	   modernization	   policies	  
were	   forced	   upon	   traditional	   society	   by	   colonial	  
powers	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  authoritarian	  states.	  
As	   the	   subtitle	   of	   this	   chapter	   suggests,	   much	  of	  
the	   focus	   turns	   to	   the	   writings	   and	   teachings	   of	  
John	  Locke.	  While	  it	  is	  important	  for	  any	  author	  to	  
carefully	   introduce	  a	  major	  Nigure	  if	  they	  spend	  so	  
much	   time	   talking	   about	   him	   or	   her	   and	   their	  
philosophies,	   I	   feel	   that	   Hashemi’s	   discussion	   of	  
John	   Locke	   is	   beyond	   superNluous;	   while	   going	  
through	   this	   section,	   the	  reader	  almost	   feels	   as	   if	  
they	   picked	   up	   another	   book	   entirely	   that	   has	  
nothing	   to	   do	   with	   the	   Middle	   East.	   Hashemi’s	  
emphasis	   is	   not	   a	   history	   of	   the	   European	  
experience,	   but	   rather	   a	   focus	   on	   developing	   a	  
liberal	   democratic	   theory	   for	  Muslim	   societies;	   a	  
more	   succinct	   summary	   of	   John	   Locke’s	   major	  
written	  contributions	  and	  overview	  of	  the	  context	  
in	   which	   he	   was	   writing	   would	   be	   sufNicient	   for	  
this	   particular	   work.	   Essentially,	   the	   main	   points	  
regarding	  Locke	  derived	   from	   this	   chapter	   is	   that	  
while	   Locke’s	   initial	   writings	   reNlected	   strong	  
support	   for	   the	   Church	   and	   sovereign,	   his	   views	  
begin	  to	   change	  with	   time	   leading	  to	  a	  signiNicant	  
shift	   that	  was	   not	   only	   seen	   in	   his	   own	  writings,	  
but	  also	  observable	  in	  society-­‐at-­‐large.	  In	  the	  later	  
part	   of	   his	   life,	   Locke,	   whom	   Hashemi	   correctly	  
characterizes	   as	   the	   ‘father	  of	  modern	  liberalism,’	  
writes	   of	   religious	   toleration	   (which	   he	  
commented	   as	   the	   ‘Christian’	   thing	   to	   do),	  
individual	   freedom	   and	  political	   authority	   which	  
sought	   to	   “redirect	   the	   moral	   compass	   of	  
Christianity.”	  (75)	  The	  issues	  were	  what	  reNlected	  
most	   of	   the	   signiNicant	   tensions	   in	   present-­‐day	  
society,	   the	  most	  prevalent	   being	  the	   ‘moral	  basis	  
of	  authority.’	  While	  Locke	  argued	  for	  a	  separation	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of	   Church	   and	   State	   and	   for	   the	   freedom	   of	  
religious	   conscience,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	  
his	   views	   were	   derived	   from	   both	   reason	   and	  
religion.	   Hashemi	   believes	   that	   in	   his	   time,	   Locke	  
might	   very	   easi ly	   have	   been	   labeled	   a	  
fundamentalist.	   In	   order	   to	   earn	   the	   attention	  of	  
the	   people,	   Locke	   had	   to	   frame	   his	   arguments	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  religion	  because	  religion	  was
such	   an	   important	   mark	   of	   identity	   at	   the	   time.	  
Hashemi	  writes:
“This	   is	   understood	   more	   easily	   if	   we	  
remember	   that	   the	   political	   culture	   of	  
seventeenth-­‐century	   England	   was	   deeply	  
infused	   by	   conservative	   Christian	   values	  
and	  thus	   any	  discussion	  of	  the	  moral	  basis	  
of	  government	  had	  to	  factor	  this	  reality	  into	  
the	  political	  discussion.	   If	  anyone	  sought	  to	  
change	   the	  political	   culture	  with	  respect	  to	  
ideas	   of	   government,	   they	   logically	   had	   to	  
alter	   the	   normative	   interpretation	   and	  
understanding	   of	   Christianity.	   A	   religious	  
reformation,	   therefore,	   was	   a	  precondition	  
to	  political	  secularization	  and	  the	  evolution	  
o f	   i deas	   tha t	   con t r ibu ted	   to	   the	  
development	  of	  liberal	  democracy.”	  (89)
This	   is	   vital	   for	   understanding	   what	   is	   and	   will	  
continue	  to	  happen	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  today.	  With	  
Muslim	  majority	  societies	   today,	   Islam	  is	   clearly	   a	  
very	   personal	   and	   signiNicant	   marker	   of	   each	  
individual’s	  identity	  as	  Christianity	  was	  in	  the	  17th	  
century.	   In	   order	   for	   change	   to	   come	   about,	   one	  
cannot	  simple	  introduce	  ideas	  that	  are	  secular	  and	  
impose	  them	  on	  the	  people	  (as	  history	  has	  shown	  
us	   the	   inherent	   failures	   in	   such	   a	   ‘top-­‐down’	  
approach).	   Instead,	   one	   must	   work	   within	   the	  
religious	   framework	   to	   bring	  about	   social	   change.	  
To	   demonstrate	   this	   in	   a	   contemporary	   Islamic	  
framework,	   Hashemi	   turns	   his	   focus	   to	   modern-­‐
day	  Iran.	  
The	  Iranian	  Example
Presently,	   reformists	  and	  conservatives	  in	  Iran	  are	  
both	   debating	   within	   a	   religious	   framework	   to	  
defend	  their	  political	  ideals,	  and	  they	  must	  do	  so	  in	  
order	  to	   be	  heard.	   For	  example,	   reformists	  assert	  
that	  those	  who	  lived	  under	  the	  fourth	  Sunni	  Caliph	  
Ali	  enjoyed	   freedom	  of	  expression	  without	   fear	  of	  
persecution.	   Thus,	   the	   Iranian	   government	   today	  
has	   strayed	   away	   from	   the	   true	   tenets	   of	   Islam.	  
Hashemi	   writes	   that	   reformists,	   using	   Islamic	  
history,	  claim	  that	  toleration	  of	  dissenting	  views	  as	  
‘more	   Islamic’	   than	   oppression.	   Another	  
interesting	  example	  which	  the	   author	   refers	   to	   is	  
that	  of	  Iranian	  Cleric	  Yusuf	  Saanei.	   This	  particular	  
cleric	  studied	  under	  Ayatollah	  Khomeini,	  who	  once	  
said	  “I	  raised	  Ayatollah	  Saanei	  like	  a	  son,”	  (92)	  and	  
held	  a	  number	   of	  prominent	   positions	  within	  the	  
government,	   including	   a	   seat	   on	   the	   Guardian	  
Council	   and	   title	   of	  prosecutor-­‐general.	   “In	  1984,	  
however,	   he	  withdrew	   from	  politics	  and	  moved	  to	  
the	  city	   of	  Qom,	   a	  center	  of	  Shia	   Islamic	   thinking,	  
to	   teach,	   study,	   and	   gradually	   develop	   a	   new	  
modern	   interpretation	   of	   Islam.”	   (92)	   Over	   the	  
next	   decade,	   Saanei	   issued	   a	   number	   of	  
controversial	   fatwas	   (including	   one	  on	   abortion).	  
Hashemi	   quotes	   Saanei	   as	   stating	   that	   his	   fatwas	  
didn’t	   “mean	   that	   we’re	   changing	   God’s	   laws…it	  
just	  means	  we’re	  reinterpreting	  laws	  according	  to	  
the	  development	   of	  science	  –	   and	   the	   realities	   of	  
the	   times.”	  (93)	  While	   any	   individual	   could	   come	  
to	   the	   same	   conclusions	   and	   interpretations	   of	  
Islam	  as	  Saanei	   has,	  what	   is	   signiNicant	  about	  this	  
particular	   example	   is	   that	   you	   have	   a	   religious	  
scholar	   and	   former	   high-­‐ranking	   government	  
ofNicial	   who	   is	   questioning	   certain	   aspects	   of	   his	  
religion	  and	  political	  system.	   I	  found	  the	  following	  
explanation	   by	   Hashemi	   especially	   useful	   to	   his	  
argument	   about	   where	   the	   social	   transformation	  
must	  begin:
“Secular	  political	  Nigures	  can	  be	  more	  easily	  
dismissed	  by	  the	  regime	  as	  no	  threat	  to	  the	  
moral	  basis	  of	  political	  authority	  because	  of	  
their	   perceived	   lack	   of	   authenticity;	  
theologians	   and	   Muslim	   democratic	  
activists	   pose	   a	   more	   serious	   challenge	  
precisely	  because	  they	  accept	  the	  basic
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religious	   framework	   of	   politics	   the	  
conservative	   clerics	   uphold	   yet	   offer	   a	  
d i s s en t i n g	   i n t e rp re t a t i on	   o f	   t h e	  
r e l a t i o n sh i p	   b e tween	   I s l am	   a nd	  
politics.”	  (101)
The	   above	   quote	   from	   Hashemi	   in	   my	   mind	  
connects	   his	   arguments	   from	   his	   Nirst	   two	  
chapters:	   that ,	   in	   order	   for	   s igni N icant	  
transformations	   in	   politics	   to	   occur	   (in	   a	   state	  
where	   religion	   is	   a	   key	   marker	   of	   identity),	  
arguments	  about	  the	  relationship	  between	  religion	  
and	   politics	   must	   be	   made	   from	   a	   religious	  
standpoint.	   One	   cannot	   simple	   suggest	   or	   force	  
policies	   of	   secularization	   on	   such	   a	   society,	   the	  
change	  must	   be	  an	  ‘organic’	  process	   as	   it	  was	   for	  
the	  Europeans.
A	  Concise	  Anatomy	  of	  Secularism:	  
Examining	  its	  Linkages	  to	  Liberal	  Democracy
In	   Hashemi’s	   third	   chapter	   on	   secularism,	   he	  
references	   a	   number	   of	   different	   scholars	   in	   an	  
attempt	  to	  deNine	  this	  concept	  while	  also	   referring	  
back	   to	   the	   European	   experience;	   although	   this	  
time	  he	  focuses	  on	  the	  French	  Revolution.	  Perhaps	  
the	  most	  prominent	  (and	  relevant)	  scholar	  that	  he	  
mentions	   here	   is	   Alfred	   Stepan	   and	   his	   Twin	  
Toleration	   theory.	   According	   to	   Hashemi,	   what	  
Stepan	   is	  arguing	   is	   that	   the	  boundaries	  between	  
religion	   and	   state	   are	   much	   more	   Nlexible	   that	  
many	   assume	   it	   to	   be.	   He	   furthermore	   believes	  
that	   there	   is	   more	   than	   one	  model	   of	   secularism	  
that	   liberal	   democracy	   can	   accommodate.	   To	  
demonstrate	   this	  point,	  he	   offers	  a	  comparison	  of	  
Anglo-­‐American	   secularism	   with	   French	  
secularism;	   while	   the	   former	   is	   said	   to	   be	  
“religion-­‐friendly,”	   the	   latter	   is	   characterized	   as	  
“religion-­‐hostile.”	   The	   reasons	   for	   this	   are	   the	  
individual	   experiences	   of	   each	   country	   in	  
transitioning	  from	  traditional	  society	  to	  modernity	  
are	  vastly	   different.	   Hashemi	   adopts	   this	   view	   for	  
himself	   as	   he	   states	   that	   “Secularism	   is	   not	   a	  
monolithic	   entity	   but	   varies	   markedly	   in	  
accordance	   with	   the	   historical	   experiences	   of	  
Church-­‐State	   relations.”	   (104)	   Hashemi	   further	  
believes	   that	   secularism	   must	   precede	   liberal	  
democracy,	   as	   certain	   constitutional	   and	  
institutional	   boundaries	   between	   religion	   and	  
state	  are	   needed	  to	   sustain	   that	   democracy.	  Thus,	  
he	   invokes	   Stepan’s	   Twin	   Toleration	   theory	   here	  
by	   asserting	  that	   since	   these	   ‘boundaries’	   are	  not	  
as	  rigid	  as	  some	  imagine	  it	  to	  be,	  Muslim	  societies	  
have	   and	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   able	   to	   deNine	   the	  
relationship	   between	   religion	   and	   democracy	   in	  
their	   own	   terms.	   By	   Twin	   Toleration,	   Stepan	  
“refers	   to	   the	  ‘minimum	  boundaries	  of	  freedom	  of	  
action’	   that	   both	   religious	   organizations	   and	   the	  
state	  must	  mutually	  recognize	  and	  respect	  in	  order	  
to	  sustain	  a	  liberal	  democracy.”	  (129)	  
While	   I	   agree	   with	   the	   notion	   that	   these	  
boundaries	  which	  Stepan	  refers	  to	  are	  Nlexible,	  and	  
thus	   the	   relationship	   between	   religion	   and	  
democracy	  will	   vary	   from	   society	   to	   society,	   I	  do	  
not	  believe	  that	   it	   produces	   ‘different’	  versions	  of	  
secularism.	   Yes,	   French	   society	   may	   be	  
characterized	   as	   much	   more	   secular	   (or	   rather,	  
more	  protective	  of	   their	   secular	   society)	   than	  the	  
U.S.	  or	  U.K.	  might	  be,	  but	  does	  this	  really	  mean	  that	  
we	   have	   different	   working	   formulations	   of	  
secularism?	   I	  do	   not	   think	   so.	   It	   is	   the	  same	  with	  
the	   concept	   of	   modernity	   and	   whether	   or	   not	  
multiple	  modernities	  exist;	  yes,	  different	  countries	  
may	   be	   at	   different	   stages	   of	   modernity,	   but	   this	  
does	  not	  necessarily	  mean	  that	   there	  are	  different	  
variants	  of	  modernity.	  Thus,	  while	  secularism	  may	  
appear	  different	  when	  comparing	  across	  cultures,	  
this	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   each	   country	   has	  
subscribed	   to	   different	   forms	   of	   secularism.	  
Rather,	  each	  nation’s	  cultural	  heritage	  and	  political	  
history	  has	   adopted	  secularism	  to	  Nit	   their	  society.	  
But	   regardless,	   what	   secularism	   has	   done	   and	  
means	  for	  each	  society	  is	  and	  will	  be	  the	  same.	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Another	   interesting	   discussion	   in	   this	   chapter	   is	  
the	   negativity	   which	   Muslim	   societies	   associate	  
with	   secularism.	   Hashemi	   states	   that	   this	   is	  
primarily	   because	   of	   two	   reasons;	   colonial	   and	  
imperial	   involvement	   (or	   rather,	   forceful	  
interference)	  in	   the	  region	  and	  post-­‐colonial	   ‘top-­‐
down’	   modernization	   policies	   that	   have	   failed.	  
Thus,	  Muslims	  associate	  secularism	  with	  the	  West	  
and	   authoritarian	   regimes.	   Stepan’s	   Twin	  
Toleration	  theory	  offers	  a	  practical	  alternative	  as	  it	  
does	   not	   use	   the	   word	   “secularism”	   but	   is	  
essentially	   the	   same	   concept.	   Stepan’s	   theory	   is	  
also	   useful	   for	   Muslim	   societies	   as,	   according	   to	  
Hashemi,	   it	   allows	   for	   religious	   groups	   and	  
organizations	   to	   still	   play	   a	   constructive	   role	   in	  
establishing	   democracy	   without	   necessarily	  
defying	  the	  major	  premise	  of	  secularism	  itself	  (i.e.	  
separation	   of	   religion	   and	   state).	   In	   conclusion,	  
Hashemi	  notes	   that	   “European	  societies	  were	  not	  
born	  with	  a	   secular	   proclivity	   embedded	  in	   their	  
political	   cultures	   but	   rather	   a	   church-­‐state	  
separation	  needed	  to	  be	  democratically	  negotiated	  
and	   socially	   constructed	   around	   an	   emerging	  
consensus	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.”	  (131)	  This	  
point	   supports	   Hashemi’s	   claim	   that	   Muslim	  
societies	   are	   capable	   of	   adopting	   a	   liberal	  
democratic	   theory,	   so	   long	   as	   that	   theory	   is	  
constructed	   ‘organically’	   and	   is	   inclusive	   of	   that	  
society’s	  history,	  both	  religious	  and	  political.
Secularism	   and	   Its	   Discontents	   in	   Muslim	  
Societies:	  Indigenizing	  the	  Separation	  between	  
Religion	  and	  State
Hashemi’s	   last	   chapter	   works	   to	   tie	   the	   main	  
arguments	   made	   in	   preceding	   chapters	   by	  
referring	   back	   to	   the	   larger	   question	  of	  how	   it	   is	  
possible	  to	   create	   a	   liberal	   democratic	   theory	   for	  
Muslim	   societies.	   Hashemi	   states	   that	   the	  
“development	   of	  an	   indigenous	   theory	   of	   Islamic	  
secularism	  will	  signiNicantly	  increase	  the	  prospects	  
for	   liberal	   democracy	   in	   Muslim	   societies.”	   (133)	  
He	   again	   references	   Abdou	   Filali-­‐Ansary’s	  
observation	   that	   there	   is	   a	   necessary	   order	   that	  
must	   be	   followed	   in	   any	   society	   undergoing	  
modernization	  (i.e.	   religious	  reformation	  precedes	  
secularization).	   Hashemi	   rejects	   the	   Orientalist	  
view	  and	  states	   that	   the	  crisis	  of	  secularization	  in	  
the	  Muslim	  world	  today	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  failures	  
of	   modernization	   processes,	   policies	   and	  
programs.	   “State-­‐led	   modernization	   from	   above	  
has	   not	   been	   matched	   by	   a	   concomitant	  
transformation	   of	   Muslim	   political	   culture	   from	  
below,	   especially	   in	   crafting	   a	   normative	  
relationship	  between	  religion	  and	  democracy	  that	  
is	   capable	  of	  supporting	  liberal	  democracy.”	  (134)	  
Hashemi	   correctly	   identiNies	   that	   liberal	  
democracy	  requires	  some	  degree	  of	  secularism	  to	  
sustain	   itself,	   yet	   Muslims	   have	   a	   very	   negative	  
v iew	   of	   secular ism	   and	   thus	   exists	   an	  
“irreconcilable	   paradox”	   for	   Muslims.	   As	  
mentioned	   above,	   the	   negative	   legacy	   of	  
secu lar i sm	   i s	   Midd le	   Eas t	   soc ie t ies	   i s	  
predominately	   a	   result	   of	   colonial	   and	   imperial	  
encounters	   over	   the	   past	   two	   centuries.	  
Interestingly,	   the	   author	   also	   points	   out	   that	  
historically	   there	   was	   no	   exact	   translation	   of	   the	  
word	   ‘secularism’	   into	   Arabic,	   Farsi	   or	   Turkish.	  
Thus,	  most	  Muslims	  began	  to	  associate	  secularism	  
with	   atheism,	   which	   has	   also	   impacted	   present-­‐
day	  understanding	  of	  this	  concept.	  
	  
Another	  contemporary	  setback	   for	  secularism	  and	  
democracy	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  was	  the	  2003	  US-­‐led	  
invasion	   and	   occupation	   of	   Iraq.	   Hashemi	   points	  
out	   that	   this	   event	   has	   deeply	   impacted	   many	  
Muslim’s	   views	   of	   democracy	   and	   has	   only	  
reafNirmed	  fears	  of	  Western	   imperialist	  ambitions	  
in	  the	  region.	  This,	  I	  believe,	  serves	  as	  a	  very	  useful	  
example	   of	   understanding	   what	   is	   happening	   in	  
the	   Middle	   East	   today	   (in	   terms	   of	   political	   and	  
societal	   progress).	   Unfortunately,	   Hashemi	   does	  
not	   develop	   this	   point	   any	   further	   and	  leaves	   the	  
reader	   to	   develop	  a	  more	   detailed	  conclusion	   for	  
themselves.
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Hashemi	   also	   includes	  a	  discussion	  on	   the	  rise	  of	  
political	   Islam	   as	   a	   reaction	  to	   the	   ‘secular’	  forces	  
in	  Muslim	  societies	  and	  how	  much	  of	  the	  rhetoric	  
in	   recent	   years	   has	   been	  opposition	   to	   the	   West.	  
Thus,	   because	   of	   its	   ‘association’	   with	   the	   West,	  
there	   is	   a	   strong	   rejection	   of	   secularism	   by	  
Islamists.	   Some	   Muslim	   scholars	   argue	   that	  
Christianity	  was	  able	  to	  adopt	  secularism	  because	  
of	  the	  lack	  of	  written	  law,	  which	  cannot	  be	  said	  for	  
Islam.	   (146)	   However,	   Hashemi	   maintains	   that	  
“modernization	   [in	   the	   region]	   has	   not	   been	  
accompanied	   by	   a	   parallel	   transformation	   of	  
religious,	   intellectual	   and	   political	   values	   on	   a	  
mass	   level”	  (149)	  thereby	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  
still	  hope	  for	  secularism	  in	  Muslim	  societies.	   “This	  
chasm	   between	   state	   secularism	   from	   above	   and	  
the	   nonsecular	   political	   culture	   from	   below	   also	  
explains	   in	  part	  why	  support	   for	   religious	  parties	  
and	  calls	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  an	  ‘Islamic	  state’	  
has	   an	   appeal	   today.”	   (151)	   Thus,	   because	   of	   the	  
lack	  of	  organic	  social	  transformation,	  that	  includes	  
a	   reinterpretation	   of	   religion	   to	   reNlect	   current	  
times,	   there	  exists	  a	  disconnect	  between	  the	  state	  
and	  its’	   people;	   one	  part	  has	   become	   secularized	  
while	   the	  other	   has	  not.	   The	  author	   believes	   that	  
Turkey	   and	   Indonesia	   both	   demonstrate	   the	  
‘prospects	   of	   liberal	   democracy’	   in	   Muslim	  
majority	  societies.	  According	  to	  Hashemi,	  each	  has	  
constructed	   an	   “indigenous	   theory	   of	   Muslim	  
secularism”	   in	   which	   Islamic	   intellectuals	   and	  
Muslim	   political	   parties	   have	   played	   a	   signiNicant	  
role	   by	   undergoing	   a	   doctrinal	   shift,	   thereby	  
contributing	   to	   the	   advancement	   of	   liberal	  
democracy.	   In	   discussing	   Indonesia,	   Hashemi	  
quickly	   makes	   the	   point	   that	   there	   is	   growing	  
support	   for	   Shar’ia	   law	   at	   the	   local	   level.	   (164)	   I	  
believe	  that	  this	  is	  a	  very	  important	  factor	  that	  has	  
and	   will	   continue	   to	   be	   problematic	   for	   Muslim	  
societies	   as	   they	  attempt	   to	  modernize	  and	  adopt	  
secularism.	   It	   would	   have	   be	   worthwhile	   for	  
Hashemi	  to	  expand	  or	  at	  least	  address	  this	  point	  at	  
greater	   length	   than	  casually	  mentioning	   it	   within	  
the	  context	  of	  secularism	  in	  Indonesia.	  
	  
The	   last	   section	   turns	   back	   to	   Catholicism	   yet	  
again,	   which	   feels	   very	  much	   out	   of	  place	   as	   the	  
main	   focus	   of	   this	   last	   chapter	   is	   on	   Muslim	  
societies.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  awkward	  placement	  of	  
this	   section,	   Hashemi	   raises	   some	   points	   that	   I	  
strongly	   disagree	   with	   and	   thus	   feel	   the	   need	   to	  
respond	  to.	   Here,	  Hashemi	  argues	  once	  again	  that	  
a	  doctrinal	   shift	  within	  the	  Church	  contributed	  to	  
modernity.	   He	   notes	   that	   historically,	   the	   Church	  
sided	  with	  the	  Sovereign,	  but	  this	  shifted	  with	  time	  
as	   the	   Church	   ‘voluntarily’	   disengaged	   itself	   from	  
the	  state	  while	  simultaneously	  adopting	  discourse	  
on	   human	   rights.	   Hashemi	   states	   “a	   religious	  
reformation	   leads	   to	   a	   religious	   accommodation	  
and	   reconciliation	   with	   political	   secularism	   and	  
universal	   human	   rights,	   thus	   lending	   critical	  
support	   to	   democratization	  efforts	   on	   the	  part	  of	  
religious	   groups	   who	   have	   previously	   bolstered	  
authoritarianism.”	   (169)	   My	   skepticism	   of	  
Hashemi’s	   discussion	   here	   on	   Catholicism	   might	  
be	   inNluenced	   by	   my	   own	   personal	   views	   of	  
religious	   institutions	  and	  the	  everlasting	  role	  they	  
attempt	   to	   play	   in	  politics,	   but	   I	   do	   not	   agree	   or	  
believe	  Hashemi	   when	  he	  states	   that	  the	   Catholic	  
Church	  voluntarily	  stepped	  down	  from	  politics	  and	  
disengaged	  itself	  from	  the	  state.	  I	  believe	  that	  such	  
a	  move	  would	  only	  have	  been	  made	  as	  an	  attempt	  
to	   salvage	   themselves	   and	   their	   reputation.	   With	  
ongoing	   debates	   about	   the	   ‘basis	   of	   moral	  
authority’	   and	   subsequent	   violent	   responses	  
against	   sovereigns	   (such	   as,	   use	   of	   the	   guillotine	  
during	   the	   French	   Revolution),	   I	   believe	   that	   it	  
would	  be	  more	  of	  a	  strategic	  move	  for	  the	  Church	  
to	   disengage	  itself	  from	   the	  state	  in	  order	   to	   save	  
itself	  and	  its	  place	  in	  society.	  The	  Church,	  I’m	  sure,	  
recognized	  the	  changing	  attitudes	  of	  the	  time	  and	  
did	  not	  separate	  itself	  from	  politics	  to	  help	  further	  
the	  social	  transformation	  but	  only	  did	  so	  to	  further	  
its	  own	  interests.	  




Nader	  Hashemi	  did	  an	  excellent	  job	  of	  building	  up	  
his	   arguments	   and	   linking	   all	   his	  major	  premises	  
from	  beginning	  to	  end.	  While	  there	  were	   sections	  
in	  each	  chapter	  that	  felt	  excessive	  and	  unnecessary	  
for	  his	  major	  arguments,	   I	  very	  much	  appreciated	  
the	   conclusions	   he	   provided	   at	   the	   end	   of	   each	  
chapter	  as	  they	  help	  to	  draw	  the	  reader’s	  attention	  
to	   what	   the	   author	   feels	   is	   most	   important	   for	  
truly	   understanding	   his	   argument.	   His	   novel	  
comparison	   of	   present	   day	   Muslim	   societies	   to	  
Christian	   societies	   centuries	   back	   is	   most	  
deNinitely	   thought-­‐provoking.	   While	   some	   of	   his	  
conclusions	   appeared	   to	   lack	   sufNicient	   support	  
(such	   as	   the	   claim	   that	   Islamic	   fundamentalist	  
g r o u p s	   a r e	   d i r e c t l y	   c o n t r i b u t i n g	   t o	  
modernization),	   I	   believe	   that	   his	  main	   ideas	   are	  
nonetheless	   very	   timely	  and	  relevant	   for	  present-­‐
day	   discourse	   on	   the	   prospects	   of	   democracy	   in	  
Muslim	  societies.	  
Hashemi	   clearly	   demonstrates	   how	   secularism	  
must	  be	  earned	  and	  emerge	  within	   the	  context	  of	  
religion	  so	  as	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  hold	  within	  society.	  
Thus,	  religious	  groups	  can	  play	  a	  signiNicant	  role	  in	  
the	   development	   of	   liberal	   democracy	   by	  
reinterpreting	   religion	  with	   respect	   to	   individual	  
rights	   and	   the	   moral	   basis	   of	   authority.	   While	   I	  
disagree	  with	  him	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  is	  more	  
than	  one	   type	   of	   secularism,	   I	   agree	   that	   Muslim	  
societies	   have	   a	   long	   ways	   to	   go	   before	   we	   can	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